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ABSTRACT

Drones are increasingly being used for tasks previously unimagined and the
beneficial uses are evolving. The United States Congress has envisioned the possible uses
of drones for both combating and conveying explosive threats and other harmful and
destructive activities. Congress’ intent is reflected in new laws (2018) and policies
(2019).
All civilian available Small Unmanned Aerial Systems sUASs (Drones), weighing
less than 55 pounds, in the current market are not designed for operations in explosive
environments. This first of a kind research focuses on further understanding of sUASs
response to explosive loading and the public policy implications. This research measured
and observed effects on a drone in flight at different heights away from the detonation of
0.5 lbs of C4 explosive.
Based upon experimental research it has been determined that the cross section of
the propeller material of a sUAS - the key component that keeps the drone aloft – is the
weakest component withstanding explosive detonations; electronic magnetic impulse
(EMP) from C4 charges was not sufficient to disrupt the flight, and the semiconductor
components did not experience failures due to very short (microseconds) high
temperatures. In all, the sUAV tested was found to be very robust. A theoretical
mathematical model showing the relationship between the distance from the blast and the
peak reflective pressure experienced by the drone is provided. Simple rules of thumb for
safe standoff heights for survival of sUAS, and minimal flight disruption during an
explosion event beneath for various weights of C-4 are provided.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. EXPLOSIVE LADEN CIVILIAN DRONES
President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated in Cairo, Egypt on October 6,
1981 while presiding over a military parade commemorating the 1973 war against Israel.
He was protected by a perimeter of 4 layers of security. Notwithstanding the security
perimeter assassins sprayed bullets from Ak-47 assault rifles and used grenades killing
him and 10 others (New York Times, October 6, 1981). Thirty-six years later, halfway
around the globe, different assassins had similar ideas to kill another leader-President
Nicolas Madura of Venezuela. He too was surrounded by several layers of security and
he too was celebrating and attending a military event (The Guardian, August 4, 2018).
But this time, on August 4, 2018, assassins adopted a more elaborate approach to
accomplish their objectives – using explosives laden drones. A drone is an unmanned
aircraft controlled by an operator physically removed and at some distance from the
drone (FAA Unmanned Aircraft systems). The assassins failed- it was not clear if the
drones were shot down or exploded prematurely. As reported, the attackers used two DJI
matric 600 model drones, (costing about USD 5,000.00 each), each loaded with one
kilogram of just C-4 explosives (Franke, 2018; Smith, 2018; Grossman, 2018; Ax, 2018).
The use of explosive drones in Venezuela is not an anomaly. Other similar use
has been reported in Israel (Ahronheim, 2018); (Zitun, 2018). So, the question is: are
explosive laden drones the new weapons of choice for criminals, terrorists and assassins?
The answer is: it seems that is the case - based upon data from global terrorism and the
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weapons used (Global Terrorism Index 2015, see Appendix B), for using explosives,
only the delivery methods are changing.
Considering weapons trends in terror attacks: 60% of terrorists use explosives as
their weapon of choice (Global Terrorism Index 2015, see Appendix B). Drones just did
not come about overnight. Drones have a history and their use is evolving with
advancement in technologies and decreasing costs. It is the combination of drones and
explosives in the air that makes their combined use a deadly combination. There are
currently very limited available tools to defeat the airborne messengers of death,
destruction and mayhem.

1.2. EVOLUTION
The populace at large had their first major exposure to drones around the year
2000 (Sifton, 2012). While the exact date is not known because it is / was classified, it
can generally be stated that a military drone was commissioned by U.S special forces and
U.S. intelligence agencies for the targeted killing of Osama Bin Laden after the 9/11
attacks on the Twin Towers in New York. The mission was unsuccessful in targeted
killing, but the drone did deliver the missiles and bombs. From the news accounts, a
Predator drone made by General Atomics was used. There are other similar military
drones: Reaper, Global Hawk (United States Air Force, 2014, 2015). These drones cost
millions of dollars and are used by the intelligence and military to protect the homeland
(United States Air Force, 2014, 2015). Appendix A shows photographs taken (with
permission) by this author of Reaper and Predator drones at Creech Air Force Base,
Nevada.
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On a different scale and spectrum, hobbyists were and had been using their
civilian radio controlled aircraft for their own use even before the modern-day unmanned
aerial vehicles now known as drones. It gradually came to light that because of drones’
versatility and capabilities that some types of smaller non-military and non-hobbyist
drones could be used for other civilian and commercial purposes; generally, drones could
play a role in numerous industries. The industries that could be served include, but are
not limited to, agriculture, real estate, inspection of remote pipelines and railroad tracks,
aerial surveying, photography, real estate, film and TV and construction. A new industry
is in the offing with high resolution lightweight digital cameras.
Drones are also known as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) or unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV), terms which are henceforth used interchangeably. Generally, the drones
are classified as small or large. Small UASs (sUAS) weigh less than 55 pounds and are
used for variety of commercial applications.
Realizing the immense potential of UAS, many manufacturers started developing
less expensive drones with limited capabilities compared with military versions but with
more capabilities than those of a hobbyist drone. By one congressional research report,
there were currently 89 UAS manufacturers in 2015 (R44192, 2015). Attachment sheets
in Appendix C provides a compilation, prepared by ATACT, of an overview of currently
available small UAS.
Recognizing the commercial opportunities that this nascent industry could create,
Congress enacted legislation to integrate drones into national airspace (PL 112-95, 2012).
As the technology is new and its use has many issues, the Congressional Research
Service for members of Congress prepared several reports to bring members of Congress
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and their staff up to speed (Cannis, 2015; Elias 2012, 2016; Gertler, 2012; Thompson,
2013, 2014, 2015). These reports are not readily available to the public. Under the new
law (PL 112-95), the FAA was required to promulgate regulations for integrating drones
into U.S. national airspace within one year of its passing. The FAA did not meet the
deadlines as required by legislation.
The FAA regulates the air space from ground up (U.S. v. Causby,1946), and was
concerned with safety in air highways with the introduction of drones in the national
airspace. (FAA and Department of Transportation, 2015, U.S. Causby, 1946).
Accordingly, the FAA proceeded cautiously in developing and promulgating drone
regulations. They developed a regulatory program to allow small UASs (like ATACT’s
Alpha X) to operate under limited conditions (FAA, 2016 also called 107 rules, FAA,
June 21 2016); and also allowed operations by granting waivers on a case- by- case basis
after a detailed review of the operator’s proposed operations. Notwithstanding its limited
flying rules, the FAA did not permit drones for commercial use.
Commercial drone operations like mail or package delivery proposed by Amazon
are currently still not permitted; and neither are any commercial operations for hire or a
fee like real estate or video photography (FAA frequently asked questions).
The FAA also wanted to bring drone hobbyists under the FAA regulatory
programs- such as registering their hobby drone to control who is in the airspace and they
therefore mandated the registration requirements for hobbyists. Hobbyists were
previously exempt from the small UAS 107 rule (Taylor v Huerta). Their compliance
measures were in accordance with hobbyist professional association guidelines. As can
be expected litigation ensued (Taylor v Huerta ,2017; Taylor V Huerta, 2018) asserting
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they were not subject to FAA rules; both district and appeals courts agreed, and ruled in
favor of the hobbyist; but in a significant measure Congress overturned the courts’
decision to vacate the registration requirements (HR 2810). Current FAA rules provide
that both small UAS and hobbyists must comply with FAA regulatory requirements in
toto as the industry grows.
The drone industry is projected to reach 3.4 million units with associated $ 1
billion in revenues. (Consumer Technology Association, 2018, Economist, 2017). In the
coming years, the drone growth industry could be dampened because implementing
regulations are still being developed; and thus, full drone capabilities cannot be utilized.
In addition, unlike other new industries, drones present unique issues that include but are
not limited to viz: greater focus on safety, collisions with aircraft, invasion of
constitutional protections of unreasonable search and seizure (reasonable expectation of
privacy is discussed extensively in U. S. v Jones, 2012; Riley v California, 2014;
Carpenter v United States, 2018). The FAA is also concerned with qualifications and
training of drone operators’ and federal enforcement of FAA regulations.

1.3. C-4 EXPLOSIVE MODERN USE - TERRORISTS EXPLOSIVE LADEN
DRONES
There are several types of explosives. There are also several types of initiators
available to trigger an explosive.
To date, C-4 explosive seems to be terrorists’ explosive of choice. C-4 explosive
is not a new explosive. The explosive has been around since 1950 and used primarily as a
military explosive and generally is not available in the open market. As recent events
demonstrate, the use and availability has not restricted C-4 use for terrorists’ activities. In
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2000 a U.S. navy ship, the USS Cole, was attacked off the Yemeni coast. The explosive
used in the attack was C-4 (CNN.com, Whitaker, 2003). According to Montgomery
County Maryland, assistant District Fire Chief Brian Geraci only ‘a pound and a quarter
can destroy a vehicle” (one stick/slab) (CNN.com). According to the reports, 600 pounds
of C-4 was used to attack the USS Cole. In 1996, C-4 was also the explosive used to blow
up Khobar Towers, killing 19 U.S. servicemen. In 1970, an ex-CIA agent was convicted
of shipping 21 Tons of C-4 to Libya for terrorists’ training schools. (He is the only
member of the International Society of Explosives Engineers to be expelled due to
ethics.) More recently, President Nicolas Madura of Venezuela was the subject of an
assassination attempt. The attackers used DJI matric 600 models, costing about USD
5,000, loaded with one kilogram of C-4 explosive (Franke, 2018; Smith, 2018, Grossman,
2018; Ax, 2018, Sources cited in Sudhakar, 2018).
Use of C-4 and similar explosives by terrorists is not going to stop; it is just a
beginning- using drones as aerial delivery systems for terrorism. Terrorists will perfect
their understanding of the combination of C-4, remote initiating systems and aerial
delivery and communication systems. Several resources to improve understanding are
readily available, as provided hereunder. Terrorists using C-4 laden drones can cause
severe damage and mayhem to accomplish their objectives- without a terrorist’s physical
presence at the scene of the crime.
The composition and characteristics of C4 are shown below for convenience; see
Figure 1.1. To the author, C-4 explosive is a “stealth explosive”. It is easily concealed, is
stable, looks harmless and is malleable (a putty) – can be shaped into a desired form. It is
detonated by a detonator activated remotely. A perfect explosive for a terrorist!
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Figure 1.1 Composition Of C4

Explosives, in general, can cause severe bodily injuries, death, destruction to
human beings, and destruction of structures. Terrorists have lots of help from readily
available resources for understanding and determining the response of buildings,

8
structures and glazing, and some of the resources even provide empirical formulae
(Draganic, 2012; Gibson, 1994; Goel 2014; Harris, N.D.; Haditha, 2015; Makovica,
2014; Ngo, 2007: Priyanks, 2012). The Department of Defense, UFC 3-340-02, Table 33 even provides a steel cutting chart for how much C-4 is needed to cut various
thicknesses of steel.

1.4. MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH
The motivation of the research was to provide law enforcement personnel
additional tools and usable information to assist these personnel in conducting their
lawful activities and minimizing their and others exposure to bodily harm and harm to the
environment from criminal elements. The aspects and why they were considered in the
research program are discussed below. This research at Missouri University of Science
and Technology (S&T) under the tutelage of knowledgeable faculty is the first step in
understanding a more detailed explosive vis-a-vis drone program. Due to potential
security implications and potential use of sUAS by criminals and terrorists only limited
items of interest are discussed in this research.
Drones open up new threat exposure pathways for criminals to cause harm. Law
enforcement must address these threats as it is their sworn duty to defeat or thwart these
threats whether potential or actual. Drones usage (either proactive or defensive
engagement) by enforcement authorities, expands their span of legal enforcement control.
As the drones operate in airspace, the potential new threat pathways are potential
threat concerns and were embodied in recent legislation (FAA, 2018) including a wide
latitude of safety and security provisions.
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A unique challenge from the traditional law enforcement perspective is that the
drones are in airspace and are controlled from a distance from the location of havoc or
damage to humans and the environment. The law enforcement response activities are
challenged because there is no criminal or terrorist present at the crime scene. At special
risks are the first responders, who have to be at the venue of criminal/terrorist site
situations to evaluate the venue conditions for the enforcement response. An innocuous
regulation for external marking of drones reflects legislative concerns for first responder
safety and security when the first responders approach a drone that might be loaded with
explosives.
Some concerns surface with criminal use of drones: How should the law
enforcement personnel evaluate the venue and its surroundings and response to
illegal/criminal activity?
A traditional law enforcement approach is to monitor the venue and activities
from the air by a helicopter. Helicopters are expensive to operate. Operating costs for a
RB22 (RB22 is manufactured by Robinson Helicopter - a single-engine two bladed main
rotor and two bladed tail rotor) are approximately $2,500 / hr. (including pilot(s), aircraft
rental, fuel, oil, gas, maintenance (FOGM) and insurance); a RB44 $5,000/ hr. and a Bell
206, used by several sheriff’s departments can be around $15,000/ hr. (Lorenz, July 24,
2019). Under the traditional law enforcement approach, after the first responders
evaluation, other law enforcement response teams (e.g. SWAT) are engaged at the crime
scene.
Drones drastically cut the operational costs, mostly the cost of a drone (few
hundred dollars to 5,000 dollars for a drone suitable for reconnaissance) and the drone
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pilot (holder of 707 certificate). Drones can also provide visuals (video and data in real
time) to first responders for the latter to take police action. As drones fly at closer
elevation from the ground, the drones can possibly be taken out by explosives on the
ground. This research explored the elevation at which the drones are obliterated. A key
element of this research was to determine how high a drone should fly for drone safety
(“standoff distance”) in the event an explosive is triggered at ground level by terrorists.
What components will fail under dynamic explosive loadings? What components
and housings have to be reinforced? This research provides a mathematically based rule
of thumb for drone safety standoff distance.
What kind of view can be observed from the drone? See a representative view of
the ground from the drone at 50ft, 40ft, 30ft, 20ft, 10ft in Figures 1.2-1.6. Types of highresolution cameras and their corresponding weight could be considered in future research.
There are several other future research considerations that will be beneficial to
law enforcement and can build on this first research step. For example, the response of a
drone launching an explosive projectile into an office where a company’s chief executive
conducts business is one case. Other future research could include drone operations at
different permissible frequencies by law enforcement to prevent hijacking of the
reconnaissance drone and hijacking of a criminal drone (generally off the shelf drones
operate at 2.4HZ and 5.8 HZ in the ISM band).
The FAA also recognizes safety, security, and privacy concerns as well as
enabling expanded commercial drone operations in the United States, including remote
identification of drones. In expressing federal policy, a new section to the law was added
to the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018-, Subtitle B, Unmanned Aircraft systems.
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Figure 1.2 Photos Of Drone At 50ft

Figure 1.3 Photos Of Drone At 40ft

In addition, FAA policy is reflected in several regulations viz: Federal Register
Vol. 81, Number 124, 42064 (June 2016); and far reaching recent further policy
promulgations- Federal Register Vol. 84 No. 30, 3732 (February 2019). This rule was
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proposed to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace; and to govern
the flight of aircraft for purposes of navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft, and
protecting individuals and property on the ground. The rule proposes three operational
categories. Category 1would limit the weight of the small unmanned aircraft. Categories
2 and 3 would limit the severity of potential injuries based on impact kinetic energy
thresholds and exposed rotating parts limitations. For operations of small UAS at night,
the rule would require the remote pilot in command to complete a knowledge test or the
appropriate training prior to operating at night and would require that the small UAS be
equipped with anti-collision lighting visible for at least 3 statute miles. Federal Register
Vol. 84 No.30, 3669 (2019) is another policy. This policy requires small unmanned
aircraft owners to display the unique identifier assigned by the FAA upon completion of
the registration process (registration number) on an external surface of the aircraft. In
absence of this policy, requiring first responders to physically handle a small unmanned
aircraft to obtain the registration number poses an unnecessary safety and security risk to
those individuals as well as to others in the immediate proximity to the aircraft, because
of the potential for the unmanned aircraft to conceal an explosive device in an enclosed
compartment (such as the battery compartment), designed to detonate upon opening.
Requiring small unmanned aircraft owners to place the registration number on an external
surface of the aircraft helps to mitigate this risk because a first responder can view the
number without handling the aircraft.
Next, Federal Register Vol. 84 No.30, 3856 (2019) is described. This policy
proposal would allow operations of small unmanned aircraft over people in certain
conditions and operations of small UAS at night without obtaining a waiver. This
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proposal incorporates performance-based requirements to achieve the agency’s safety
objectives while simultaneously encouraging the development of solutions in this
dynamic environment.

Figure 1.4 Photos Of Drone At 30ft

Figure 1.5 Photos Of Drone At 20ft
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These policies affect progress, either by accelerating it or by putting limits on
it. For example, the policy for external markings was published in February 2019.
Appendices D and E provide the process and implementation tools (Kraft and Furlong,
2105).

Figure 1.6 Photos Of Drone At 10ft (Close Enough To Identify A Package)

Because of drones’ versatile use (and misuse) and mobility and with little or no
available countermeasures, the combination of drones and explosives is potentially
deadly. Some misuses by criminals and terrorists include: muggings (yes! aerial mugging
- criminal flies the drone equipped with explosives or weapon close to the potential
victim and demands victim’s compliance with the terrorist’s demand, instructions to part
with monies, other articles etc.), dropping explosives or detonating explosives causing
mayhem, deaths and injuries, or setting off explosives pre-placed on the ground to thwart
and destroy (take out) law enforcement, reconnaissance and responder drones, or
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equipping drones with explosive projectiles against law enforcement. For example,
ISIS is currently using drones to drop grenades from tubes.
Law enforcement may send their reconnaissance drones in a single-story building
(about 10 feet building height) and the criminals may have preset explosives to destroy
the drones. Another possible scenario could be explosives dropped from 50 feet (five
stories building height) for detonation on the ground as explained in Section 3.1.
What should U.S. policy be - ranging from completely outlawing uses (as have
many countries across the globe) or have a controlled limited policy for beneficial uses of
drones? One can only develop policies upon understanding of the cause and effect- in the
subject case, explosives and drones. Specifically, the impact of explosives on drones.
Drones have extensive applications such as detection of explosives (past Los Alamos
research was using bees for detection of explosives (Science Daily, 2006)), use by law
enforcement to launch explosive projectiles in their operational activities, and other
applications in explosive environments as discussed in items in the Future Research
section.

1.5. CONTRIBUTION TO SCIENCE
This first of kind research furthers understanding of the interaction of sUAS with
the detonation of explosive charges. The research provides numerical correlation of
explosive weight to standoff distance of safe operation of sUAS. Further, the research
provides easy-to-use rule of thumb versions of standoff distances and safe guidance
envelop for field use by non-technical personnel. In addition, the research provides and
describes: (1) the destruction of a drone from explosive charge detonation, (2) adversely
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affected flight characteristics from detonation where a sUAS may be subject to
momentarily disruptive capability to maintain control and may be recoverable unless it
crashes into objects, and (3) the sequence of sUAS and components failure during knockout from the air due to explosive detonation.
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2. LITERATURE AND EXISTING DRONES

2.1. LITERATURE
Drones are relatively new, and the public policies are developing. There is a
paucity of scholarly articles regarding public policies with respect to explosive laden
drones. One such article providing overview (Vergouv, et.al, 2017) is not current with
the technologies that are available today. There are several public policy concerns with
drone technology and its expansive capabilities, such as invasion of constitutional
protections of unreasonable search and seizure (Doyle, 2012; Congressional research
service R1734; Lipman, 2016; Stevens, 2011; Thompson, 2015,). A key concept in
privacy is reasonable expectation of privacy. In a landmark case with a unanimous (rare)
verdict, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed expectation of privacy extensively in U.S. v
Jones, 2012; (Carpenter v United States, 2018), infringement of the constitutional right
to the use and enjoyment of one’s property- trespass (physically entering one’s property)
and invading one’s air space and also taking unauthorized pictures and videos. In
addition, unlike other new industries, drones present other unique issues that include but
are not limited to viz: greater focus on safety and collisions with aircraft. The FAA is
also concerned with qualifications and training of drone operators and federal
enforcement of FAA regulations. The U.S. Government is concerned about privacy issues
as they relate to drone usage. A new section of The FAA Reauthorization Act adds a
section 358 that addresses privacy:
“The Comptroller General of the United States, in consideration of relevant
efforts led by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
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shall carry out a review of the privacy issues and concerns associated with the
operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system”.

2.2. DRONES IN THE CURRENT MARKET
An anatomy of drones and basic components and airflow is provided: Drone
anatomy, parts and components, pictorial wiring diagram, terminology (Appendix F),
Propeller Dynamics (Appendix G) and Electromagnetic and Radio Frequency Spectrumthe frequencies at which the commercial drones operate (Appendix H). A list of available
commercial drones is provided as Commercially Available Drones (Appendix C). The
drones in Appendix C originated as hobbyist drones and remain so but are slowly being
adopted in the commercial market. The author’s company is developing drones for the
commercial market. These drones’ descriptions are provided as Z7 Drones USA – model
summary in Appendix I. The drones used for the experiments are Z7 Alpha drones.

2.3. CURRENT POLICY AND DEVELOPING POLICIES
Recently, Google and Amazon announced commercial deliveries by drones to
consumers (Tyko, Kelly, 2019; Barkkho, Gabriela, 2019). Uber is in the process of
obtaining approvals for fast food drone delivery (Dukoitz, 2019). Drones are also being
used to provide blood and life product deliveries (Taylor, 2018).
Then, there is the sinister use of drones by criminal enterprises viz: assassinations
(attempts), disruption of commerce (Franke, 2018; Smith, 2018; Grossman, 2018; Ax,
2018, Rowlatt, Justin, 2019) and aerial surveillance as a prelude to harm causing
activities (APPENDIX J). Explosives have been weapons of choice for terrorists (Global
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Terrorism Index, 2015); only now the delivery methods have changed to include the
use of drones. Congress has envisioned possible deployment of drones for these harmful
and destructive activities and this is reflected in new laws and policies.
Small UAS (drones) by definition weighing less than 55 pounds are being used
for a variety of purposes. Their use is evolving. These drones are classified as aircraft by
the FAA, which has jurisdiction in National airspace (NAS) and drones operate in NAS.
The FAA has primary oversight for their safe operations. The FAA has imposed
limitations on drone operations, as provided in Appendix K. The FAA coordinates with
state and local law enforcement, state aviation agencies, and state and local government
(GAO, 2018).
It is the versatility of sUASs which raises several safety and security issues.
sUASs can breach traditional security perimeters at critical infrastructures such as
powerplants, public venues, and mass gatherings (GAO, 2018). Drones could be used by
terrorists or criminals to conduct reconnaissance to plan their activities with impunity
under US laws and execute their nefarious activities at a time of their choosing. (See
Appendix J- Anatomy of Terror.)
As described above, Congress recognized the beneficial uses of drones and
enacted laws to integrate drones in NAS. As described below, Congress also recognized
malefic uses of sUASs and enacted laws to address safety, security and privacy issues
(FAA Reauthorization Act 2018). A small UAS typically is not detected by radar, the
small UAS pilot is usually not identified, or the small UAS or other physical evidence is
not recovered. This research furthers understanding of the interaction of explosives and
sUASs from the point of view of both beneficial and malefic uses.
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The sUAS market has substantially grown because of technological advances
and Federal government policy to integrate drones into national airspace (FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA. P.L. 112-95), (See Appendix L.)
Drones have beneficial uses to society and drone applications are increasingly being
deployed for applications never previously imagined. Some tasks which drones can
perform are immensely beneficial to society. While the beneficial uses get the most
attention the use of drones for nefarious, dangerous and criminal activities are just
beginning to gain attention.
Drones pose several policy concerns, primarily safety and privacy (GAO, 2018).
From the law enforcement perspective, additional/other concerns are the destruction of
aircraft and facilities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, August 14, 2018), and
interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications. While FAA
regulations are federal regulations and thus primary regulatory regulations, all states have
developed their own regulatory scheme (see Appendix M).
2.3.1. Regulations Background. On June 28, 2016, the FAA published the
final rule for Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS
Operation and Certification also known as part 107 final rule). A summary of this
rule is provided as Appendix K. This risk-based rule was one of the first regulations
to integrate small UAS (sUAS) into the National Airspace. (Federal Register Vol 84,
No 30, February 13, 2019, p 3733). The FAA issued the rule under 49 USC
401039(b)(1) and (2) to ensure safety of aircraft and efficient use of airspace and (2)
govern the flight of aircraft for the purposes of navigating, protecting and identifying
aircraft, and protecting individuals and property on the ground. This rule “established
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a new part in the Code of Federal Regulations, 14 CFR part 107 (part 107),
containing remote pilot certification and operating rules for small UAS weighing less
than 55 pounds. Under those rules, anyone operating a small UAS must either hold a
remote pilot certificate or be under the direct supervision of a remote pilot in
command”. Under this, the 107-rule prohibited sUAS operations at night (§107.29)
and operations over people, without a waiver (§ 107.39 and §107.200).
Federal Register Vol 84, No 30 (February 13, 2019) proposes to change the
above described limitations. The proposed rule, if adopted will have a profound
impact on sUAS manufacture, liabilities for manufacturers, manufacturers have to
provide a Declaration of Compliance and more complex features will need to be
installed on sUASs. Also affected will be sUAS operations and commerce (package
deliveries, operations at night- provided the sUAS is equipped with an anti- collision
light visible for at least three statute miles (A statute mile is 5,280 feet. This is
distinguished from a nautical mile, which is approximately 6,076 feet and is often
used as a unit of measure in aviation).
The proposed rule adds three categories of permissible operations. The
category descriptions include concepts of engineering - transfer of energy. A very
brief overview of salient summary requirements are as follows:
Category 1
“The FAA has determined that unmanned aircraft weighing less than
0.55 pounds pose a low risk of injury when operating over people. Accordingly,
Category 1 is simple and straightforward: Operators would be able to fly small
unmanned aircraft weighing 0.55 pounds or less over people. However, these
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operations would be subject to all of the existing requirements governing small
UAS operations in part 107”.
Category 2
The proposed rule also imposes significant manufacturers’ responsibilities because of
the risk. “The FAA proposes a set of performance-based requirements that would
allow a small unmanned aircraft to operate over people if the manufacturer can
demonstrate that, if the unmanned aircraft crashed into a person, the resulting injury
would be below a certain severity threshold. It imposes three requirements under this
category: (1) the small unmanned aircraft must be designed, upon impact with a
person, not to result in an injury as severe as the injury that would result from a
transfer of 11 ft-lbs. of kinetic energy from a rigid object, (2) that the unmanned
aircraft would not have exposed rotating parts that could lacerate human skin and (3)
no small UAS could be operated over people if it has an FAA - identified safety
defect. For Category 2, a safety defect would be any material, component, or feature
that presents more than a low probability of causing a casualty when operating over
people. For this proposal, the FAA defines a casualty to be a serious injury, which
corresponds to a level 3 injury on the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS).
Category 3
Requires a sUAS to be designed, upon impact with a person, not to result in an injury
as severe as the injury that would result from a transfer of 25 ft-lbs. of kinetic energy
from a rigid object. Because of higher threshold of injuries there are operational
limitations: (1) prohibits operations over any open air assembly of people, (2)
operations would have to be within or over a closed- or restricted-access site and
anyone within that site would have to be notified that a small unmanned aircraft may
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fly over them and (3) for operations not within or over a closed- or restrictedaccess site, the small unmanned aircraft may transit but not hover over people.
2.3.2. Drones Potential Malicious Use Leads To New Laws. Only law abiding
citizens are going to follow these rules. Criminals and terrorists will ignore them during
their illegal activities. Because of the potential for criminal and terrorist activities, very
significant law provisions were added to the FAA Reauthorization act of 2018 and
regulations to be implemented were proposed on February 2019 and were published for
public comment.
The first was a new section for Drones (unmanned aircraft systems) Subtitle B unmanned systems. A new Chapter 448 was added. It contains numerous new provisions
that specifically address sUAS.
For purposes of this dissertation and bringing the issues to the fore, the second
section buried in the voluminous FAA reauthorization act, Division H – Preventing
Emerging Threats, is very significant. The new section, pursuant to Subtitle A of title II
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.121 et seq.) was amended by adding sec.
210g, protection of certain facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft.
The provisions of Division H express the U.S. Congress’s concerns and protection
of certain facilities and assets from drones.
It states in part:
…..[t]ake such actions as are described in subsection (b)(1) that are necessaryto
mitigate a credible threat (as defined by the Secretary or the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation) that an unmanned aircraft
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system or unmanned aircraft poses to the safety or security of a covered facility
or asset.
The actions authorized are the following:
“(A) During the operation of the unmanned aircraft system, detect, identify,
monitor, and track the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without
prior consent, including by means of intercept or other access of a wire
communication, an oral , or an electronic communication used to control the
unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
“(B) Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft,
including by passive or active, and direct or indirect physical, electronic, radio,
and electromagnetic means.
“(C) Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft,
without prior consent, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or
unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire,
oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft
system or unmanned aircraft.
“(D) Seize or exercise control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned
aircraft.
“(E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned
aircraft.
“(F) Use reasonable force, if necessary, to disable, damage, or destroy the
unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
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“(3) RESEARCH, TESTING, TRAINING, AND EVALUATION. —The
Secretary and the Attorney General shall conduct research, testing, training on,
and evaluation of any equipment, including any electronic equipment, to
determine its capability and utility prior to the use of any such technology for any
action described in subsection (b)(1)….
“(c) FORFEITURE. —Any unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft
described in subsection (a) that is seized by the Secretary or the Attorney General
is subject to forfeiture to the United States.
These actions excerpted above from Section 2 “Preventing Emerging Threats Act
of 2008” Section 1602, Section 210G authorize the Attorney General to take such actions
as described above of (A)-(F) to mitigate a credible threat.
The above changes in laws and regulations emphasize the drone’s usage in
national airspace and the potential of harm caused by drones.
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3. TEST PLAN

3.1. CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF TEST PLAN
The test plan was developed to simulate conditions that could exist for various
drone applications at various elevations. The drone applications envisioned both law
enforcement activities and nefarious activities by criminal and terrorists’ enterprises.
Using the data from tests, the idea was to arrive at standoff distances where the
drone would not be adversely impacted from explosives on the ground and still be able to
be usefully deployed (from law enforcement and other useful purpose perspective). The
other considerations were: What impact will the explosive shock (albeit, a very short
length range) have on the components (flight controller, drone frame, antennae,
component housings). Of particular interest are the propellers, which are the weakest
link, but also the most crucial components which keep the drone airborne. What will be
the impact of the resulting fire ball, and heat on the drone and its components? In
addition, as advised by the Chair, the idea was to develop equations and a rule of thumb
for the transition between safe and unsafe standoff distance.
It is to be noted ALL commercially available drones are designed to be operated
under ambient conditions. This research under the tutelage of world explosive experts
(Chair Dr. Worsey) is first of its kind to develop further understandings of sUAS
(Drones) subject to the effects of explosive detonation.
An explosive shock wave imparts dynamic loads for a very short duration and
several orders of magnitude more than static loading during an explosion. Explosion
pressures decay extremely rapidly with distance from the source. The duration of the
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event is very short, measured in thousandths of a second, or milliseconds. This differs
from earthquakes and wind gusts, which are measured in seconds, or sustained wind or
flood situations, which may be measured in hours. Because of this, the mass of the
structure has a strong mitigating effect on the response because it takes time to add
energy to alter the inertia to mobilize the mass of the structure. By the time the mass is
mobilized, the loading is gone, thus mitigating the response (FEMA 426).
How and why will a drone fail and what damage will it sustain under explosive
shock? What should be the “standoff distance” for the drone being used by law
enforcement and other law-abiding citizens and groups? The “standoff distance” concept
is the distance away from an explosion where the drone would avoid
destruction/disablement. Some application precedents exist viz: In Philadelphia, PA,
USA an explosive device was authorized and dropped from the air by law enforcement
onto a building where criminal activities were being conducted (Stevens, W., May 14,
1985).
Criminals don’t care for laws and regulations but are only interested in damage to
their intended target and any resulting collateral damage. For criminal enterprises, the
drones and explosives concealability, easy operations, and cost (because the drone will be
destroyed) are considerations. Two examples of criminal precedents include: two drones
used in a failed assassination attempt of the President of Venezuela (Franke, 2018; Smith,
2018; Grossman, 2018; Ax, 2018) and drones used to disrupt commerce during the
holiday season at Gatwick Airport, UK (Rowlatt, April 14, 2019).
Commercially available drones are provided in Appendix C. Albeit FAA defines
sUAS (drones) of less than 55 lbs.- very few commercial drones approach this weight
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limit. The ALPHA drone design and fabrication (used in the tests for this dissertation
and specified in Appendix F) was for a typical drone commercially available today. The
ALPHA weighs less than 2 lbs (See Figure 3.1). The ALPHA dimensional envelop is
14.5 inches (See Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.1 ALPHA Drone Weighs Less Than 2 lbs

This ALPHA drone was designed to include components which are readily
available off the shelf and inexpensive. Using information from Google, other public
sources, YouTube, etc., one can build a drone similar to ALPHA. ALPHA drones with
batteries can be taken in a backpack in the airport without objection from TSA; an
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ALPHA type drone is easily concealable. Coupling drone concealability with C4
explosives- putty-, a criminal has a perfect cocktail to cause mayhem, injury, and pure
destruction and thwart law enforcement activities.

Figure 3.2 ALPHA Drone Dimensional Envelope

Eleven tests were conducted. The test set up, and an accompanying diagram are
discussed in Section 3.5. Test 1 was to establish a base line and did not involve a drone. It
was planned that the drone would fly at 50 feet above a ground explosive with 10 ft
decrements thereafter until reaching 10 ft. A height of 50 ft was used as a starting point
because a building story is about 10 feet; and 50 ft height represents a 5-story building.
Law enforcement or criminal enterprises could use drones from a 5-story building or fly
at 50 ft, to observe damage effects on a drone. The 50 ft height represents the maximum
practical height to drop an explosive charge with any accuracy. It is also the furthest
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distance for close surveillance and preliminary examination. As stated above, it is very
similar to an incident in Philadelphia where Mayor Goode authorized dropping an
explosive device on criminals (details not publicized).
Tests 2-10 were conducted at discrete reduced elevations to determine the ground
explosive’s impact on the drone and to determine the threshold elevation at which the
drone was destroyed by explosive shock wave. (See the recorded time stamps from the
camera.) The same test was conducted for the drone at 50ft (Test 2), 40ft (Test 3), 30ft
(Test 4), 20ft (Test 5), 12 ft (Test 6), 10ft (Test 7), 8ft (Test 8), 5ft (Test 9), 3ft (Test 10),
and 4ft (Test 11). The drone was not damaged or seriously affected at 10 ft and above. So
after 10ft, the issue was to reduce the drone elevations by smaller increments to
determine at what elevation the drone would be obliterated.
Using the data from the tests, the idea was to arrive at standoff distances where
the drone would not be adversely impacted from explosives on the ground and still be
able to be usefully deployed. The other considerations were: What impact the explosive
shock (albeit, a very short length range) will have on components (flight controller, drone
frame, antennae, component housings) especially the propellers (the weakest link) which
keep the drone airborne. What will be the impact of fire ball, heat on the drone frame and
the drone components? These items are discussed in Sections 4, 5 and 6. Also provided
is useable information - Sudhakar-Contreras equation and rule of thumb. (See Section 6).
The following test plan was designed to develop an understanding of the
consequences of exposure of drones to overpressure from detonation of explosives. To
develop a good understanding of the effects of explosives both qualitative and
quantitative analyses are presented.
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The plan envisioned the effects of hemispherical charges on drones: a scenario
in which criminals and terrorists place and detonate the explosives on the ground with
overflying drones such as surveillance drones. The research does not envision a scenario
where explosives are dropped from drones and detonated in mid-air. In this latter
situation, the geometry of the charges would be approximated as spherical, with
detonation occurring at an elevated location. Even in the latter scenario consideration
needs to be given for explosives that fall on the ground and are detonated- either
accidently or by design. The latter scenario is a potential area of investigation for future
research.
To comport with explosives detonation on the ground, hemispherical charges
were used as test shots to avoid any non-uniform effects due to charge shape. The starting
point of the estimation of overpressure was using equations developed by Kingery
Bulmash, and an online blast parameter calculator was used for the parameters- C4,
weight of explosives and distance. Dr. Catherine Johnson, a member of this research
committee with Dr. Paul Worsey (Chair) provided the following guidance for blast
overpressure predictions for loading on structures.
The test plan was designed to develop an understanding of the consequences of
exposure of drones to overpressure from explosives. A drone subjected beyond a certain
overpressure will critically damage it, and the drone will no longer be airborne.
Experimental testing to determine threshold pressure for the drone as a whole and its
components as a yardstick (as reasonably practical) is essential to develop drone designs
(hardware, software, and use of appropriate materials), countermeasures, public safety
and other considerations.
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Understanding of exposure to drones in explosive environments and
development of countermeasures is needed, as no research (civilian) as to the effects of
explosives on drones is available as of June 2019. One of the questions that needs to be
considered is how far a drone standoff should be in the air to survive a detonation, either
deliberate or accidental. The experiments in this research are a first step in understanding
effects of explosives on drones. These experiments envisioned drone destructive tests. In
other words, a drone(s) would be destroyed during tests. Ergo, four identical drones were
fabricated. The test drones (ALPHA) were designed and manufactured for the
experimental tests by the Academy of Threat Assessments, Countermeasures and
Technology (ATACT), an entity owned by the researcher. Four drones (separate units)
were fabricated and available to ensure sufficient number of drones were available during
the experiments of explosives on drones in case multiple drones were knocked out.

3.2. DRONE DESIGN
Criminals/terrorists will use small inexpensive drones for reasons of cost and
maneuverability. They would not want to use an expensive drone for their nefarious
activity. Smaller drones are also easily concealed. ATACT drones were fabricated similar
to the type of drone a criminal would likely use in an explosive environment. ATACT has
air shipped ALPHA drones previously with no issues with TSA security and air transport.
The classification of small drones, of which ALPHA is representative, is sUAS.
All sUAS have rules (see Appendix K). These drones weigh less than 55 pounds and
have operational limitations. They are generally quadcopters, which means four
propellers. Their endurance is short, only a few minutes. Heavier small drones can carry a
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higher payload. A hex copter which ATACT has also developed can carry up to 5
pounds with an endurance limit of 15-25 minutes. Cinematography cameras can weight
up to five pounds. The payload can be higher with a bigger drone size, but the endurance
will be shorter, unless an alternative fuel system or dual fuel system is designed. ATACT
is designing a drone for endurance, that can go several kilometers. These drones can be
used for reconnaissance of natural disaster areas. As payload increases and size increases,
so does the cost.
Most currently available commercial drones are manually controlled (inputs)
using a frequency of 2.8GHz. A method of manually controlling a drone is by using
joysticks. Joysticks used to manually control the ALPHA are shown in Figure 3.3.
The on board flight controller/processor is a small circuit board with embedded
sensors (generally gyroscope and accelerometer) and functions on small currents (not
equipped to handle EMP). The on board flight controller used was a MATEKYS F405
CTR as seen in Figure 3.4. The on board flight controller sends signals to the electronic
speed controller (ESC) shown in Figure 3.5. The ESC controls the motors with the
propellers attached shown in Figure 3.6. Overall, the on board flight controller receives
commands and controls the motors attached to the propellers to keep the drone airborne.
This entire connection is shown in Figure 3.7. A diagram with all connections on the
drone, including the flight-controller-ESC-motor-propeller connection is shown in Figure
3.8.
Also shown in Figure 3.8 are three antennas. One of the three antennas works at
5.8 GHz and the other two work at 2.4 GHz frequency. The two 2.4 GHz antennas are
used for accepting the handheld control signals wirelessly. The two antennas are needed
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to improve the quality and reliability of the wireless signal, which is called antenna
diversity. Their diversity is beneficial because the signals can be reflected upon multiple
paths before being finally received. From the controls to the receiver, signals can bounce,
introduce phase shifts, time delays, distortions, and attenuations. Dual diversity mitigates,
to a degree, these situations. The receiver takes these signals and converts them for the
flight controller to interpret as seen in Figure 3.9. The 5.8 GHz antenna and its video
transmitter (VTX), shown in Figure 3.10, are used for video transmission. The camera
that can be used for video transmission is shown in Figure 3.11. The camera is a Foxeer
arrow micro pro 600TVL FPV camera.

Figure 3.3 Joystick For Manually Controlling Drone

Figure 3.4 Flight Controller (Size Perspective; Quarter Is 0.955 inches) Each Corner Is
Dedicated To A Separate Motor
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Figure 3.5 Electronic Speed Controller (Size Perspective; Dime Is 0.705 Inches)

Figure 3.6 Brushless Motor Diameter Approximately 1 Inch, and Height 0.72 Inches
(Size Perspective; Quarter Is 0.955 Inches)
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Figure 3.7 Flight Controller To Propeller Connectivity Controls

For video transmission, a frequency of 5.8 GHz is generally used in commercial
drones. The ALPHA drones were fabricated with hardware for these frequencies, albeit a
video camera was not installed for reasons of weight and the utility of video output
during a blast. The recorded video would yield very fuzzy, rapidly moving picture
frames, which are not useful.
A GPS unit was glue mounted (mechanically). Each test drone was equipped with
a RDQ BN-880 GPS unit. This unit sends the signal (manually controlled by the ATACT
pilot) to the flight controller and provides instructions as to the height the drone should
fly, as shown center bottom in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8 Pictorial Wiring Diagram

The battery (seen in Figure 3.13) is securely fastened by Velcro strap to the drone
frame. The three antennas are zip tied to the frame. The GPS unit is double taped to the
GPS housing. The propellers are secured by screws to the motors (screw seen in Figure
3.12). All the wiring is zip tied to the frame. All components are zip tied or Velcro
strapped or duck taped to avoid connections becoming loose during flight.
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Figure 3.9 Antenna Receiver And Connection To Flight Controller

Figure 3.10 5.8 GHz Antenna And VTX For Video
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Figure 3.11 Possible Camera Mounting For Surveillance Purposes Not Used In
Experiments (Size Perspective; Dime Is 0.705 Inches) Resolution Of 600TVL (768*494)

An overview of the ALPHA drone with its connections is seen in Figure 3.12.

Figure 3.12 Test Drone Before Tests
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Figure 3.13 ALPHA Drone Battery 14.8V, 1300 mAh, 19.24Wh

Unlike hobbyist commercial drones, the ALPHA was equipped with a barometer
sensor to detect pressure changes with elevation change. Detailed specifications and
technical description of the drone is given in detail in Appendix F.
This type of drone has three degrees of rotation motion along 3 axes viz: YAWrotation (spinning) front of drone to the left or right about an axis running up and down;
PITCH- rotation of the drone front up or down about an axis from left side to right side
and ROLL- rotation around an axis from the front to the rear of the drone. For hobbyists,
commercial drones are pre-programmed for use by a compatible manual joystick
controller like in Figure 3.3. The ALPHA flight controller used open source software to
incorporate additional inputs. Albeit flight dynamics of a drone are different from
traditional fixed wing aircraft or helicopter rotary blade flight dynamics, the FAA terms
drones as aircraft (Huerta v. Pirker, 2014).
To provide moisture resistance in light rain the components were coated with
Silicon Modified Conformal Coating. A wearable blast pressure sensor (more
information in Section 3) was mounted on the drone using a Velcro strap/tie. The focus in
these experiments was understanding the effects of the standoff distance from a blast.
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The ALPHA used in the experiments can be equipped with a camera and the
video can be recorded for initial recon by law enforcement prior to taking law
enforcement action. The ALPHA is a representative type of drone that could be used by
law enforcement, (as well as the public) ergo the drone design.
The drone was calibrated before use by using satellites. Calibration guides are
provided by the INAV Github repository (INAV, March 23, 2019). The flight controller
is programmed with the iNAV software. The iNAV software provides flight modes. The
flight modes used were POSHOLD WITH NAV ALTHOLD. These modes “locked in”
the drone in 3D space. ATACT pilot was Skip Spillman. He calibrated the drone using
iNAV and used his piloting skills and coordination to position the drone above the C4
detonation. When the ALPHA drone drifted, the pilot (Skip) made adjustments using the
digital manual controller (joystick). The manual controls by the pilot were to compensate
for the drift as explained in section 3.7. The pilot controlled the height and 2D position of
the drone. This gave a 3D position for the flight controller to hold. Once there, the flight
controller worked to maintain that altitude and GPS position. The fabricated drone
(ALPHA) hardware and other details are provided in Appendix F and previous sections.

3.3. SITE LOCATION
For the purpose of this work, one of the considerations for flying drones is the site
location. Drone operations and the industry are highly regulated by the FAA, as discussed
in previous sections. Drones can only be flown in permissible airspace, with height
restrictions, clear of powerlines, with clear line of sight, minimum distance from an
airport and the like (see Figure 3.14). The drones’ GPS has to be calibrated through
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satellite triangulation. The ALPHA drones were first calibrated and flight tested in an
open field not too far away on private land. The site provided satellites ranging from 12 20 satellites. A Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP) of 1.2-1.8 was achieved. The
term HDOP is used in satellite navigation and describes errors in navigation satellite
topology. A HDOP between 1-2 is very good (Langley, May 1999).

Figure 3.14 Airspace Classification (National Academy of Sciences, Figure 2.1:
(February 2018)
During the experiments on May 5-10, 2019, the mine area where the drone was
flown was and is in Class E airspace as in Figure 3.14. The classifications are designed
for safety reasons and obtaining permissions before flying a drone in the national
airspace. In conjunction, before flying, one needs to verify from Air Map, an app on the
phone, to determine if permission is required to fly the drone at the location of the drone
flight. At the time of the May 2019 experiments, Air Map was checked and no
permission was required for the drone flight at that time. However, while preparing this
dissertation, the Air Map was again reviewed because conditions might have changed,
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and permissions may be required. Indeed, when Air Map was checked, in September
2019, a permission is now required for flights in the same mine area location. It is to be
noted, the permission, depending on the area, generally, can be obtained after inputting
the flight location on the Air Map itself. So, that means if experiments were conducted
today (September 2019) and thereafter if the drone was flown in the mine area, prior
authorization would be needed. It is to be noted that the drones can fly in the same
national air space used by other aircraft (based on the policies of integrating drones into
the national airspace as indicated in Section 2) provided required authorization and sUAS
rules including safety (Appendix K) are followed for drone operations in the national
airspace.
Recently as a part of drone integration in the national airspace, the FAA, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and industry partners conducted
traffic management demonstrations (Rattigan, K., September 5, 2019). One
demonstration took place at Virginia Tech on June 13, 2019 where separate drones
delivered packages, studied wildlife, surveyed a cornfield while emergency helicopter
flights also took place concurrently. Drone flights and drone operators were notified
using UAS Volume Reservation (UVR) Alert. In a second demonstration on July 10,
2019, in Grand Forks, North Dakota, a photographer and Part 107 operator took
photographs of firefighter training near an airport. During the flight, the drone operator
received a UVR alert indicating a medevac helicopter was transporting a patient to a
nearby hospital. In the third demonstration, Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems in
Las Vegas on August 1, 2019, there were separate drone flights over a golf course to
survey the land and take videos. At the same time a fire had broken out at the clubhouse
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and the first responders were sent via helicopters. The first responders submitted a
UVR and drone operators were notified. These demonstrations show that traffic
management systems, even though at initial stages will allow integration of drones with
other aircraft provided FAA rules and safety considerations are observed.

Figure 3.15 Test Site

The explosive test site used that met both requirements (blast and FAA) is located
at the (S&T) Experimental Mine Site (Figure 3.15).

3.4. EXPLOSIVES USED
Before the start of the experiments, a reasonable estimate of overpressure was
selected as a starting point. The starting point was based on using an elevation of 50 ft
(for the reasons described above). The Kingery Bulmesh equation gave a theoretical
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value of just less than 2 psi. In the explosive laden drone case in Venezuela (from
Introduction Section), 1 kg (2.25 lbs) was used with a commercial hobbyist DJI drone.
For consistency and repeatability, 0.5 lbs of C4 was chosen for the experiments, to be
under range limits but still in the same rough order of magnitude.

Figure 3.16 Explosive Shot Components - 0.5 lbs C4, 10g Stinger And Detonator

The components for this explosive setup are shown in Figure 3.16 and listed in
Table 3.1. The booster (stinger) was used as recommended to initiate detonation of the
C4 charge and to avoid an improper detonation and ensure consistent results. Each
component was taken from the same box/lot to further ensure consistency.
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Table 3.1 Explosive Components used for the tests
Explosive Components used for the tests
Detonator

Austin, Rock Star (1.4 Explosive B1),
60 ft length, 425 ms delay

Stinger

Trojan Stinger (Dyno Nobel- 10 gm 0.353
oz Super prime cast booster)
Composition Pentolite 50/50 PETN/TNT

Main Charge

Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC
Composition C4- Uno 483 RDX
Desensitized, 1.1D, PG II.

Figure 3.17 Detonator Trip Wire Stinger Assembly

The set up to initiate a C4 charge for the tests is shown in Figure 3.17. A trip wire
was used as a break sensor to set off the start of high speed camera recordings and data
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acquisition (discussed later in Section 3.8.1), as shown in Figures 3.17 and 3.18. The
trip wire is cut instantaneously when the detonation is triggered. A cross section diagram
of how the detonator and booster are placed relative to the C4 with respect to the plate is
shown in Figure 3.19. The steel plate is used to make good contact between the
Detonator/Stinger and C4 hemisphere. The trip wire worked well during the experiments,
as can be seen from the data recordings. This is the standard, well tried method used by
Dr. Johnson’s research group at S&T.

Figure 3.18 0.5 lbs C4 Hemisphere Charge On Steel Plate For Test

Figure 3.18 shows the explosives set up just prior to the blast on a steel plate. The
C4 is the explosive in the white hemisphere and labelled as such. The two blue and white
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wires to the right of the charge are the loop of the trip wire. Not seen in Figure 3.18 is
the stinger + detonator + trip wire assembly connections, which is beneath and obscured
by the C4 charge, but this is described in Figure 3.19 and this assembly is shown in
Figure 3.17. The entire assembly is inserted into the hole from the bottom of the steel
platform to positively mate with the C4 hemispherical charge above, thus establishing a
good solid contact with the charge to avoid the potential of a misfire or weak initiation, as
shown in Figure 3.19.

Figure 3.19 Cross Sectional Diagram Of C4-Detonator-Stinger-Trip Wire Assembly
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3.5. EXPLOSIVE TEST SPECIMENS
For ensuring consistency of the explosive test specimens, 0.5 lbs (226.8 gms) of
C4 was measured, as shown in Figure 3.20, for each test.
Hemispherical molds were 3D printed by S&T, into which 0.5 lbs (226.8 gms) of
C4 was hand compacted. The two molds made from NylonX Carbon Fiber Filament (see
Appendix N), shown in Figure 3.21, were 3D printed by MST to contain 0.5 lbs of C4 up
to the top of the hemisphere. The dimensions are shown in Figure 3.22. The mold size
compared to a quarter is shown in Figure 3.23. Also shown is the mold size measured by
tape in Figure 3.24.

Figure 3.20 Measuring C4 For A Single Shot
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Figure 3.21 Hemispherical Molds For 0.5 lbs. Of C4 shots

Figure 3.22 Mold Dimensions
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Figure 3.23 Molding (Size Perspective; Quarter)

Figure 3.24 Mold Ruler Measurement
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Figure 3.25 0.5 lbs Of C4 Being Formed

By compacting C4 in the molds, specimen samples were made for each of the 11
field shots (see Figure 3.25). The plastic was used for transportation, packaging, and to
flatten the base as shown in Figure 3.26.

Figure 3.26 Final C4 Hemisphere Specimen With Plastic Wrappers To Flatten The
Horizontal Portion Of The Hemisphere
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3.6. PLACEMENT OF PRESSURE SENSORS DURING TESTS
Pressure sensors (which are discussed in Section 3.8.2) were used to record
pressures in the surrounding of the C4 hemisphere discharge. The diagram in Figure 3.27
shows the placement of the sensors in reference to the 0.5 lbs of C4. The video recordings
of the tests from cameras is discussed in Section 3.8.1.

Figure 3.27 Instrumentation Plan

The sensors at 6ft, both the flush mount and the wearable (discussed later), were
set to represent the height at which a drone would fly inside a single story building or for
close inspection. The sensor located at 50ft was placed envisioning a drone that would
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normally fly at 50 ft. In both the circumstances, the goal was to develop further
understanding of the interaction of explosives being detonated at ground level with the
drone, specifically their impact at 6ft and then at 10ft intervals from 20ft up to 50ft.
The flight controller on the drone was in GPS hold mode as described in Section
3.4. The altitude of the drone was recorded from the drone’s GPS/barometer, as shown in
Figure 3.28. This is one example of a variable the drone recorded during the tests. As
described in Section 3.4, the flight controller adjusted to the height and also the GPS
location. The drone height was close to the test elevations listed. The drone cannot
remain at the exact height due to variables such as wind drift, and GPS reading
fluctuations. The heights were close estimates. The model developed later takes these
fluctuations into account. The drone height was visually located at 3 ft using a 2x4 piece
of wood for scale that was 3 ft long (see Figure 3.29), in anticipation the drone would be
destroyed near that height. Any data recorded by the drone near that height, if recorded,
would be unreliable because the drone would be destroyed and inoperable and the data on
the SD card would probably be corrupted. For higher elevations, the GPS was used to
locate the drone elevation. This matched closely with the drones’ recorded information,
as can be seen from the height data recorded on the drone at the 30ft test. The drone
elevation is not static. It moves up and down, as illustrated in Figure 3.28, because of the
nature of the propeller mechanics, because of wind drift and GPS readings from satellites.
There are challenges to keep the drone stable in one location due to wind
fluctuations during and at the moment of the test, and using GPS to exactly locate the
drone over the charge due to location wandering (differential GPS is not yet available on
sUAVs). The flight controller uses feedback to control the drone’s motors which in turn
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provide the requisite torque and speed to the propellers to match the programmed
height. Independently, data was recorded on the drone itself showing barometer readings
representing the elevation of the drone. The trained drone pilot kept the drone in the air
horizontally and vertically at various heights over the charge as closely as reasonably
practical. The elevation positioning of the drone was accomplished using GPS which
approximates the vertical elevation, and visual line of sight. As described in Section 3.4,
the GPS was programmed for 2D positioning.

Figure 3.28 Height Recorded From The Drone's Barometer Sensor During Test
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3.7. SENSORS SET UP DURING THE EXPERIMENTS
Table 3.2 summarizes the equipment used in the testing. The prices were provided
by Dr. Barbara Rutter of MS&T Explosives Engineering.

Figure 3.29 A Three Foot 2x4 Was Mounted As Shown For Visual Guidance By The
ALPHA Drone Pilot For Height Of Three Feet
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Table 3.2 Equipment Used During Tests
Equipment
ICP Pressure Sensor Model

Number
5

102B04
Wireless Wearable Blast

Purpose
Measure incident

Price
$850

pressure
6

Gauge System (equipment

Measure reflective

$1,000

pressure

see Appendix P)
Phantom v 2012 Camera

1

Record video of

$32,000

explosion and effects
on drone
Blaster’s Ranger II Camera

1

Record video of

$10,000

explosion and effects
on drone
Synergy P data acquisition
system

1

Record measurements

-

from sensors

It was planned to measure overpressures at specific distances from the charge
location horizontally and vertically. Horizontal distances were fixed locations on the
ground. The C4 detonation was initiated by a Scorpion HB-SBS solid State Electronic
Blasting Machine located safely in the initiating building location (bunker), shown in
Figure 3.30. The bunker was to protect the data acquisition system and allow it to be
about 50 ft away from the blast. It also provided personnel operating the data acquisition
system protection from explosion effects. Supervision and safety were paramount and
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were continually addressed. The assembly of personnel other than the drone pilot and
camera operator were in the bunker for safety during operation. A Synergy P data
acquisition system was used to collect data (See Appendix S). The overall view of the
sensor locations, which is depicted by Figure 3.27, is shown in Figure 3.31.

Figure 3.30 Safety Bunker Used To House The Data Acquisition System And To Initiate
Shot (North Is Towards The Bottom Of This View.)

A close-up photograph of a ground sensor configuration is shown in Figure 3.32.
A wearable sensor mounted on the drone measured the overpressure from the blast at
various drone elevations.
The wood in Figure 3.32 is for providing a platform for the sensors. It also serves
for the sensors to be close to the slab, while not mounted on the slab.
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Figure 3.31 Setup With Sensors

Figure 3.32 Flush Mount And Wearable Sensors And Wiring Set Up

3.7.1. Cameras Used During Tests and Set Up. Both a dedicated camera
operator and a trained drone operator were a part of the research team. The camera
operator and drone pilot were located at the camera blind.
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Figure 3.33 Phantom Camera Setup

Two high speed cameras (Phantom and Ranger) were used to record in real time
each charge detonation for each drone test. The Phantom camera used was a model v2012
(see Appendix Q for specifications); the Ranger camera used was a Model # BRIITS5HC4-B (see Appendix R for specifications). The Phantom camera is hidden from
view in Figure 3.33 inside the steel blast shelter but can be seen in Figure 3.34. The
Phantom camera was placed in a steel blast shelter with Plexiglass Windows because it is
a very expensive piece of equipment (~USD 32,000) compared with the Ranger camera
which is less expensive (~USD 10,000). The Phantom camera provided black and white
pictures at a frame speed of 24,000 frames per second (every 44.67 us) with output as a
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cine file (see Appendix Q for specifications). It was the primary camera used for video
analysis due to its higher frame rate. The Ranger camera provided real time color
photographs and served as a backup/secondary role. The Ranger recorded at a frame
speed of 231 frames per second with a maximum record time of 17.3 minutes.
The Phantom Camera setup is shown above. The Ranger camera is not shown in
the picture because the delivery and setup of the Ranger camera occurred after the
photograph was taken.

Figure 3.34 Phantom Camera Setup Inside Protective Blast Shelter

3.7.2. Pressure Sensors Used and Set Up. Two types of sensors were used to
measure incident and reflective pressures. Flush mount PCB sensors (ICP Pressure
Sensor, Model Number 102B04) measured incident pressure (sampling every 500ns, 2
million samples per second); wearable sensors (Blast Gauge System Sensor) measured
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reflective pressure on the ground and on the drone (sampling every 10 microseconds,
100,000 samples per second) as seen from Figure 3.35. The minus sign in the time refers
to samples before the trigger for the explosion was recognized. The specifications for the
flush mount sensor are in Appendix O and for the wearable sensor are in Appendix P. A
zoomed in view of both of these sensors is shown in Figure 3.36.

Figure 3.35 Data From Wearable Sensor Showing Sampling Rate

As the experiments were destructive tests, expensive wearable sensors were
dismounted from the drone at a drone height of 8 ft and below to prevent the expensive
wearables mounted on the drone from destruction. Eight feet was an estimation that at
this height, a drone would be destroyed from C4 detonation and the wearable reflective
measuring sensors would also be destroyed or seriously damaged by their proximity to
the explosion.
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Figure 3.36 Wearable Sensor (Black) And Flush Mount Sensor (Silver)

A synergy data acquisition system was used to record real time data at sample
rates up to 100 MS/s from the wearable sensor and the flush mount sensor (sampling
every 500ns). This Synergy system is a data recorder and provides data in real time. See
Appendix S.

3.8. WEATHER DURING EXPERIMENTS
The tests were conducted over four days at the Experimental Mine. Weather
conditions were important during the experiments. Rain and drizzle could stop or hamper
drone operations and affect the measurement of pressure by sensors on exposure. Rain
and drizzle did periodically hamper the test operations and the operations had to be
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ceased during heavy rain. In anticipation of light rain and drizzle at the test site the
drone key components were coated during manufacture with a Silicon Modified
Conformal Coating manufactured by MG coatings. Save for heavy rain durations, the
drones and electronic communication system operated during light rain and drizzle with
no problems.

3.9. CLOSE OUT
After four days of testing, eleven experiments were completed. Cleanup was
performed, and equipment returned to the respective S&T departments.
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4. RESULTS

4.1. SUMMARY OF TESTS
Eleven tests were carried out with the setup described in Section 3. Table 4.1
qualitatively summarizes the eleven tests. Quantitative summaries with data collected
from sensors will be discussed in Section 5. Reasons for failure of the drone due to the
explosion in test #10 are discussed in Section 6.

Table 4.1 Tests Summary
Test #

Drone Height Above

Drone Condition

0.5 lbs of C4 (ft)

After Explosion

1

No drone

No drone

2

50

Operational

3

40

Operational

4

30

Operational

5

20

Operational

6

12

Operational

7

10

Operational

8

8

Operational

9

5

Operational

10

3

Incapacitated

11

4

Operational

It can be seen from Table 4.1, that the drone was incapacitated when it was
closest to the explosives at 3ft (Test 10). After Test 10, an identical drone was tested at
4ft, which survived relatively unscathed and was still operational after Test 11. Thus, one
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can conclude that a distance of 3ft above the explosives for the ALPHA drone was
where the detonation of 0.5 lb of C4 could incapacitate the drone.
The drone flying at a height of 50 ft (Test 2) did not show any visually observable
flight effects from the detonation of a C4 charge. The drone elevations were reduced in
Tests 2-7 down to 10 ft. At 8ft (Test 8), there were some noticeable effects from the
explosion on the drone trajectory, but this did not incapacitate the drone. It was not until
the elevation was reduced to 3ft (Test 10) that the ALPHA drone was incapacitated.
The two cameras described in Section 3, Ranger (color camera) and Phantom
(black and white camera), both recorded footage of the drone for each test. The Phantom
camera was recording at 24,000 frames per second (41.66 us per frame).

4.2. TEST 8 – CAMERA RECORDINGS OF DRONE DURING EXPLOSION
At 8ft (Test 8), the explosives did not incapacitate the drone. The following three
figures show snapshots from the Phantom Camera during Test 8. Table 4.2 summarizes
the screenshots in this subsection. The drone was in the fireball and then inside the cloud
of smoke but was unharmed by the blast.

Table 4.2 Screenshot Descriptions For Test 8
Figure

Description

4.1

(Phantom Camera) Alpha at 8 ft when detonation initiated

4.2
4.3

(Phantom Camera) Fire ball just below Alpha, no visible
effect
(Phantom Camera) Alpha in the periphery of the fire ball, no
visible effect
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Figure 4.1 Drone At 8 ft At Moment Of Detonation (10.38 us From Trigger In Video)

Figure 4.2 Phantom Camera Showing The Alpha At 8 ft No Visible Effect (14320.91 us
From Trigger In Video)
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Figure 4.3 Phantom Camera- Alpha In The Periphery Of The Fire Ball, No Visible Effect
(19945.11 us From Trigger In Video)

4.3. TEST 9 – CAMERA RECORDINGS OF DRONE DURING EXPLOSION
At 5ft (Test 9), the explosives did not incapacitate the drone. The following three
figures show snapshots from the Ranger Camera during Test 9. Table 4.3 summarizes the
screenshots in this subsection. The drone was in the fireball and then inside the cloud of
smoke. The drone was pushed up to a higher elevation, and then descended almost
touching the concrete slab, probably due to the air vacuum after the blast. The drone then
corrected itself back to the initial altitude. The drone was unharmed by the blast.
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Table 4.3 Sequence Of Snapshots From The Ranger Camera (5ft)
Figure

Description

4.4

(Ranger Camera) Alpha at 5 ft when detonation initiated

4.5
4.6

(Ranger Camera) Alpha pushed up to a higher elevation,
inside smoke cloud
(Ranger Camera) Alpha descended to a lower elevation,
almost touching the concrete slab

Figure 4.4 Drone At 5ft During Detonation (Time 0:29s In Video)

4.4. TEST 10 - CAMERA RECORDINGS OF DRONE INCAPACITATION
Test 10, with a standoff of 3ft, knocked the drone out of the air, causing it to
crash. This test is therefore focused on. Screenshots are shown from the video recordings
of the drone failure for Test 10, from both cameras as follows.
4.4.1. Ranger Camera. The following snapshots taken from the Ranger color
camera capture the drone in a fire ball and propellers on the drone being destroyed. Table
4.4 summarizes the sequence of snapshots for this subsection.
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Figure 4.5 Alpha Pushed Up To A Higher Elevation, Inside Smoke Cloud (Time 0:45s In
Video)

Figure 4.6 Alpha Descended To A Lower Elevation, Almost Touching The Concrete Slab
(Time 1:35s In Video)
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Table 4.4 Sequence Of Snapshots From The Ranger Camera (3ft)
Figure Number

DESCRIPTION

4.7

ALPHA at 3 ft just before the shot detonation

4.8

ALPHA at 3 ft in ball of fire immediately after the shot

4.9

Sequence 1 ALPHA rising in elevation during explosion

4.10

Sequence 2 ALPHA banking to the left; propeller broken top
left

4.11

Sequence 3 ALPHA upside down, no controls

4.12

Sequence 4 ALPHA turned sideways, no controls

Figure 4.7 Test 10 Just Before The Shot Detonation (Time 0:16s In Video)

In Figure 4.8, the drone has been blown upwards by more than 1 ft. It is also in an
unstable position.
In Figure 4.9, the drone is higher in elevation up to 5.25ft above the blast. The
drone has been inverted.
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Figure 4.8 ALPHA In Ball Of Fire Immediately After The Shot (Time 0:19s In Video);
Approximately 4.3 ft Above Blast

Figure 4.9 Ranger Camera- Sequence 1 ALPHA Rising In Elevation During Explosion
(Time 0:22s In Video); Approximately 5.25 ft Above The Blast

In Figure 4.12, the drone is flipping. The scale is estimated. The drone reached
approximately a maximum height 9ft before falling to the ground. The drone is in an
unstable trajectory due to the blast.
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Figure 4.10 Sequence 2 ALPHA Banking To The Left; Propeller Broken Top Left (Time
0:24s In Video); Approximately 6 ft Above The Blast

Figure 4.11 Sequence 3 ALPHA Unstable And Inverted With No Controls (Time 0:29s In
Video); Approximately 7.5 ft Above The Blast

4.4.2. Phantom Camera. Figure 4.13 taken from the Phantom camera (black
and white) also captured the drone in a fire ball and propellers on the drone being
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destroyed. The resolution in this photo is higher as the camera was zoomed in
further than the Ranger and individual parts can be seen breaking away.

Figure 4.12 Sequence 4 ALPHA At Maximum Height, Turned Sideways, No Controls
(Time 0:39s In Video); Approximately 9 ft Above The Blast

Figure 4.13 Test 10 Immediately After The Shot, Components Breaking Off In Air,
Propellers Breaking Off, GPS Dislodged (52688.66 us From Trigger In Video)
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4.5. DRONE CONDITION AFTER TEST 10
The drone was incapacitated after Test 10. The drone was found on the ground as
shown in Figure 4.14, approximately 13ft away from the detonation center at the edge of
the slab towards the bunker (North).

Figure 4.14 Incapacitated Drone After Test 10

Figure 4.15 is the drone after it was incapacitated from Test 10 after recovery of
the parts. As can be seen, the majority of the propellers were broken, the GPS unit was
shorn off, and the 2.4 GHz receiver antenna was also broken off. The motor was broken
away from the mount and the drone landing bumper was separated.
The motors’ shaft worked from the signal from the flight controller and speed
controller. However, because the drone lost propellers, the drone could not remain aloft.
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Figure 4.15 Drone and Recovered Pieces After Test 10; Two Propeller Blades Were Not
Recovered
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5. ANALYSIS

5.1. ROAD MAP OF ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The previous sections of this dissertation presented the test plan and an
explanation of the results of the interaction of the drones and explosives. Qualitative
analysis of why the Alpha obliterated at 3 ft follows in the next section. This section also
discusses quantitative analysis of the results. Peak pressures are of importance for
understanding the interaction of the ALPHA drone and the detonation of the C4
explosive charges.
To provide a meaningful analysis, the following road map will be used for this
section.
1. A comparison of incident and reflective pressure values for ground sensors is shown.
The reflective pressure is always higher than incident pressure, the increase depends upon
angle of incidence of the wave (see Appendix U). When the incident pressure impinges
on a structure that is not parallel to the direction of the wave’s travel, it is reflected and
reinforced, producing what is known as reflected pressure (DHS December 2003). The
incident and reflective wave are merged near the detonation point and form a single
reinforced wave (Le Blanc et. al., 2005). Going forward, reflective pressures are
discussed because they were measured on the drones and were the maximum the drones
experienced.
2. Table 5.1 shows peak reflective pressure values recorded on the ALPHA at various
elevations using wearable sensors. This table shows increasing pressure as the drone is
closer to the ground.
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3. A table of theoretical peak reflective pressure (Kingery-Bulmash) vs distance away
from explosion is presented. The parameters used by Kingery-Bulmash are: Distance,
Type of Explosive, Weight of explosive. Kingery-Bulmash provides both the incident
and reflective pressures for the chosen parameters.
4. Tables comparing the experimental and theoretical peak pressure values, impulse
(defined below), and duration are presented.
5. Equations and a graph developed for projections of peak pressures vs distance on
drones for 0.5 lbs of C4 blasts are presented.
6. A graph of amperage usage by ALPHA motors is provided. It showed no induced
currents as per the chart in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
7. MATLAB was used for determining peak pressure from data point records. Sample
data records are shown in Appendices T and V.
For incident pressures, there were 603,157 flush mount data point records overall.
For wearable sensors (reflective pressure measurements), 6 sensors were used (5 sensors
on the ground +1 sensor mounted on drone) for 7 shots (for ALPHA elevations 50ft, 40ft,
30ft, 20ft, 12ft, 10ft, 8 ft) producing a total of 84,672 data record points.
To determine the peak reflective pressures from 84,672 data points, the MATLAB
program was used with a script written within MATLAB to determine the peak values.
(See Appendix W). MATLAB was used because it is a standard software for engineering
with multiple features for data analysis. To utilize MATLAB, scripts are written. See
Appendix W for an example.
The reflective pressure samples were measured at 10 microseconds (timestamped)
to capture shock waves that last a few milliseconds. This sampling rate provides a picture
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of reflective pressure variations at short intervals. To get good precision on the
measurement of peak pressure you need 300 to 600 measurements in the positive phase
(impulse time frame) (Worsey, P.; 2019, September 2). Prior to the 3ft elevation test, the
wearable sensor was removed (because it is expensive equipment) and would not lead to
meaningful results due to the destruction of the sensor itself. At 3 ft, the alpha drone was
obliterated.
With each test, the drone was moved closer and closer to the blast. Shown in
Figure 5.1 is a graphical representation of the reflective pressure obtained for the drone
for Test 8 (drone at 8ft). It is representative of the data collected for different sensors on
different tests. The peak pressure was the maximum pressure recorded by the sensor. The
impulse is the area under the positive phase recorded. The phase duration is the amount
of time the positive phase lasted. During the phase duration in Figure 5.1, approximately
146 samples were taken. The maximum pressure and impulse values were determined in
Excel, as seen in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.1 Graphical Representation Of Ground Sensor Data From Wearable Sensor For
Test 8
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Figure 5.2 Test 8 Values Determined In Excel Using Functions On Raw Data Of
Wearable Sensor

The phase duration is not shown in Figure 5.2. The phase duration was manually
calculated by determining the time when pressure changed from approximately 0 to
positive pressure (start) (Figure 5.3) and the time when pressure changed from positive to
negative (end) (Figure 5.4). The phase duration in this example is 1.260-(-0.2)= 1.46
milliseconds. With a sample rate of 10 microseconds, there were 146 samples during the
phase duration.

Figure 5.3 Begin Phase Duration Determination
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Figure 5.4 End Phase Duration Determination

5.2. INCIDENT AND REFLECTIVE PRESSURE FOR GROUND SENSORS
From the early results, the data from the wearable sensor (providing reflective
pressure readings) on the ground 20ft away from the blast location was found to be
defective. As can be seen in Table 5.1, it provided unusually low readings. Perhaps it was
out of calibration. It measured less pressure than the wearable sensor on the ground 30ft
away. The measured pressure from the sensor at 20ft should have been higher than the
sensor at 30ft. Thus, the data from the sensor was deemed defective because of faulty
readings.
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show a comparison of the reflective and incident
pressures for the wearable sensors on the ground 6ft, 20ft, 30ft, 40ft, and 50 ft away from
the blast for various elevations for the drone (Test 2 (Drone at 50ft), Test 3 (Drone at
40ft), Test 4 (Drone at 30ft)).
Looking at Tables 5.1-5.3, it can be concluded that the pressures recorded on the
ground, for the different tests (Tests 2-4), were independent of the height of the drone.
Thus, the flush mount sensors were removed for further tests. The peak pressure recorded
from the flush mount sensor at 6ft for the 50ft test was lower than the two other tests. As

82
a possible explanation, the analysis was done after all the experiments and the
discrepancy could possibly be due to a faulty connection.

Table 5.1 Measured Reflective And Incident Pressure For Ground Sensors (Test 2)
Drone at 50 ft
Distance of

Peak Reflective

Peak Incident

Number of times

Sensor Away

Pressure (psi)

Pressure (psi)

Peak Reflective

from Blast (ft)

Pressure is to Peak
Incident Pressure

6

29.66

20.98

1.41

20

2.72

2.81

0.97

30

4.97

2.26

2.20

40

1.96

0.76

2.58

50

1.7

0.64

2.66

Table 5.2 Measured Reflective And Incident Pressure For Ground Sensors (Test 3)
Drone at 40 ft
Distance of

Peak Reflective

Peak Incident

Number of times

Sensor Away

Pressure (psi)

Pressure (psi)

Peak Reflective

from Blast (ft)

Pressure is to Peak
Incident Pressure

6

39.38

20.98

1.88

20

2.72

2.51

1.09

30

4.86

1.58

3.07

40

1.96

0.74

2.64

50

1.49

0.67

2.23
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Table 5.3 Measured Reflective And Incident Pressure For Ground Sensors (Test 4)
Drone at 30 ft
Distance of

Peak Reflective

Peak Incident

Number of times

Sensor Away

Pressure (psi)

Pressure (psi)

Peak Reflective

from Blast (ft)

Pressure is to Peak
Incident Pressure

6

37.56

17.94

2.09

20

2.76

2.68

1.03

30

5.08

1.66

3.06

40

1.96

0.66

2.97

50

1.6

0.56

2.85

5.3. MEASURED PEAK REFLECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE DRONE AT
VARIOUS ELEVATIONS (WEARABLE SENSOR)
Table 5.4 shows the measured peak reflected pressure recorded from the wearable
sensor on the drone at various elevations. As mentioned before, the wearable sensor was
removed from the drone after Test 8 in order for the expensive sensor not to be destroyed.
As expected, the peak reflective pressure measured increases as the drone is closer to the
blast. The distances to the drone are approximate and cannot be measured with the same
accuracy as the distance on the ground. With slight variations in the distance, the
pressures will change with the cube of the distance. These experiments did not have
advanced instrumentation to measure the one-to-one match for the distances of the
ground sensors compared to the distances to the drone.
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Table 5.4 Measured Peak Reflective Pressures On Drone At Various Elevations
Measured Peak Reflective Pressures on Drone at Various Elevations
Height of Drone

Peak Reflective

Reflective Impulse

Ratio

Away from

Pressure (psi)

(psi-ms)

8 (Test 8)

34.27

24.80

1.38

10 (Test 7)

11.31

5.51

2.05

12 (Test 6)

8.48

5.08

1.67

20 (Test 5)

4.28

2.47

1.73

30 (Test 4)

3.77

2.47

1.53

40 (Test 3)

2.39

1.45

1.65

50 (Test 2)

1.7

1.31

1.29

Blast (ft)

5.4. THEORETICAL PEAK REFLECTIVE PRESSURE EXPERIENCED BY
THE DRONE
An online calculator for the Kingery Bulmash equations was used to find
theoretical values of peak reflective pressure and peak incident pressure. A screenshot of
the Kingery Bulmash online calculator is shown in Appendix X. The purpose was for
comparison with experimental values. Variables entered into the calculator were 0.5 lbs
of C4, and different distances correlating to different heights of the drone, and how far
away ground sensors were from the blast. A summary of obtained theoretical values is
given in Table 5.5. The KB equations give results that the positive phase duration during
these tests would be in the range of 1.13ms-2.15ms. Since 300-600 samples are needed to
get a good estimate of the peak pressure, a good enough sampling rate would have been
3.76 us. Since the sampling rate of the wearable sensor was 10us, the results are not the
most accurate for peak pressure and the values are all lower than the predicted values
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below 30 ft. The ratio of reflected to incident pressure peaks increases as the distance
is reduced, as expected from the information in Appendix U.

Table 5.5 Theoretical Values From Kingery Bulmash Equations
Theoretical Values from Kingery Bulmash equations
Distance

Incident

Incident

Reflected

Reflected

Away from

Peak

Impulse

Peak

Impulse (psi-

Blast (ft)

Pressure

(psi-ms)

Pressure

ms)

(psi)

Ratio

(psi)

3

101.70

9.91

503.34

30.32

3.06

6

21.02

5.18

63.93

12.91

2.49

8

11.54

4.02

30.12

9.24

2.29

10

7.56

3.31

18.15

7.18

2.17

12

5.49

2.81

12.58

5.87

2.09

20

2.49

1.75

5.34

3.38

1.93

30

1.44

1.18

3.01

2.20

1.86

40

1.00

0.89

2.06

1.63

1.83

50

0.76

0.72

1.55

1.29

1.79

5.5. COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL REFLECTIVE
PRESSURES EXPERIENCED BY THE DRONE
The experimental results for peak reflective pressure are compared with the
theoretical values obtained from the previous section in Table 5.6. The impulse of the
experimental results is also compared with its theoretical counterpart in Table 5.7, and
the experimental phase duration is compared with its theoretical values in Table 5.8. The
reflective pressures were the governing pressures causing failure of the propellers at the
propeller-motor spindle connection. This is explored further in Section 6.

86
Table 5.6 Comparison Of Peak Reflective Pressure With Theoretical Peak For
Wearable Sensor Onboard The Drone
Comparison of Peak Reflective Pressures (Drone at Different Heights)
Distance Away

Experimental Peak

Theoretical Peak

Deviation of

from Blast (ft)

Reflective Pressure

Reflective Pressure

Experimental to

(psi)

(psi)

Theoretical (%)

8

34.27

30.12

13.78

10

11.31

18.15

-37.57

12

8.48

12.58

-32.59

20

4.28

5.34

-19.85

30

3.77

3.01

25.25

40

2.39

2.06

16.02

50

1.7

1.55

9.68

The peak reflective pressure was both more than and below theoretical values for
different elevations. The percent deviation ranged from -37.57% to 25.25%. The
transition from negative deviation (underestimation) to positive deviation (overestimate)
happens between 20 and 30 ft. This is expected due to the clipping of high frequency
peaks.
The experimental reflective impulse was significantly more than the theoretical
reflective impulse when the drone was 8ft away. While there was general agreement
between the theoretical and experimental values at distances 10ft and beyond, the
theoretical pressures from the Kingery Bulmash equations were lower than observed at
10ft and below. Other than this, the percent deviation ranged from -26.26% to 12.27%.
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Table 5.7 Comparison Of Reflective Impulse With Theoretical Peak For Wearable
Sensor Onboard The Drone
Comparison of Reflective Impulses (Drone at Different Heights)
Distance Away

Experimental

Theoretical

Deviation of

from Blast (ft)

Reflective Impulse

Reflective Impulse

Experimental to

(psi-ms)

(psi-ms)

Theoretical (%)

8

24.80

9.24

168.40

10

5.51

7.18

-23.26

12

5.08

5.87

-13.46

20

2.47

3.38

-26.92

30

2.47

2.20

12.27

40

1.45

1.63

-11.04

50

1.31

1.29

1.55

Table 5.8 Comparison Of Positive Phase Duration
Comparison of Positive Phase Duration (Drone at Different Heights)
Distance Away

Experimental

Theoretical Positive

Deviation of

from Blast (ft)

Positive Phase

Phase Duration

Experimental to

Duration (ms)

(ms)

Theoretical (%)

8

1.45

1.13

28.32

10

1.65

1.27

29.92

12

2.3

1.37

67.88

20

2.44

1.62

50.62

30

2.37

1.85

28.11

40

2.47

2.02

22.28

50

3

2.15

39.53
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The experimental positive phase duration was always greater than the
theoretical phase duration. The percent deviation ranged from 22.28% to 67.88%. This
can indicate that the sampling rate of the wearable sensor was too low to keep up with the
true phase duration excepting at distances of 40ft and 50ft.

5.6. EQUATIONS OBTAINED FOR PEAK PRESSURES ON DRONES –
ACTUAL AND BEST FIT
A best fit equation was found to describe the relationship between the distance of
the blast and the peak reflective pressure experienced by the drone. The equation
describes the peak pressure experienced by the drone where the height of the drone is the
independent variable. The equation was obtained using MATLAB scripts for curve
fitting. See Appendix W for an example script. The initial parameters were changed, and
the parameters were recursively updated until satisfactory parameters were found
automatically.
The equation derived is
y = 12.8958e-0.0439x + 1027.2e-0.0579x^2
where y is the reflected pressure (psi), and x is the height of the drone (ft) relative to
blast. The same procedure was also performed for the theoretical data.
In Figure 5.5, one curve is theoretical, and the other is measured. The values as
the drone is closer in distance to the blast are higher, because as the shock wave expands,
pressures decrease rapidly. Because the profiles of the measured and theoretical values
are similar at 8ft and above, one can determine (predict) intermediate values between the
test elevations.
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Figure 5.5 Theoretical And Measured Obtained Equations

5.7. AMPERAGE USED BY ALPHA MOTORS
The current used by the circuit board on the drone was recorded during each test.
The amperage showed normal operations (approximately straight line), as can be seen in
Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The Phantom camera has the capability to provide the exact
explosion time. The drone had its own recording rate (approximate frequency of 2KHz),
which was independent of the recording of the Phantom camera. The data log from the
drone had a UTC timestamp for when the drone recordings began. By knowing how
many seconds elapsed from the start time, an approximate time for when the explosion
happened could be approximated for the drone data, as shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The
drone was not intended to be equipped with the same sensors and the same data
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acquisition as the Phantom camera. The data on these figures were recorded during the
tests when the drone was 8ft and 3ft above the explosion, respectively. There was no
evidence that an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) was generated and recorded by the drone.
In Figure 5.6, the peaks are extra current from the programmed flight controller to the
motors to stabilize the drone from drifts.

Figure 5.6 Amperage Vs. Time (Test 8, Drone At 8 ft)

5.8. CLOSE OUT
This section provided quantitative analysis of the values collected from the
sensors during the tests. A discussion of why the drone failed is presented in Section 6.
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Figure 5.7 Amperage Vs. Time (Test 10, Drone At 3 ft)
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6. DISCUSSION

6.1. ENGINEERING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DRONE FAILURE UNDER
EXPLOSIVE DYNAMIC LOAD
There are several components of an Alpha drone which are subject to explosive
dynamic loads. The Alpha type drone was designed using off the shelf components for
ambient conditions, not explosive conditions. Under ambient conditions, the leading
environmental condition is closer to static loading. Under explosive conditions, the loads
are dynamic, which are several times the static loads. This section furthers understanding
of why the drone failed using engineering principles and concepts. The sections that
follow provide the findings of the research/conclusions (Section 7), and future research
(Section 8).
The drones were subjected to an explosive blast experience dynamic loading but
of extremely short duration. The shock wave dissipates relatively quickly with distance.
The impulse from explosive shock is defined by integration of pressure over time. 𝐼 =
∫ 𝑃(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 Where I = impulse (psi-ms or Mpa-ms), P= Pressure (psi or MPa), and T= time
(ms). Alpha type drones can reasonably perform under ambient conditions but as seen
from the tests these drones structurally fail under high enough explosive dynamic loading
(impulse).
Many drone components are loaded/stressed during an explosion. The main
component considered was the propeller; specifically, failure of the propeller under
explosive load. The weakest link in a drone, the component which keeps drone aloft, is
the propeller. If the propeller fails or is nonfunctional, the drone cannot remain aloft.
Another component considered was the flight controller, a semiconductor device, the
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brains of the drone which provides adjustment and provides the current to the brushless
motors. Several sensors, including GPS, can be and are connected to the flight controller.
Proper functioning of the flight controller is important because the flight controller is a
semiconductor and it is functional over certain ranges. Given intense heat and high
temperatures, will the semiconductor survive? An illustrative example: a smart phone
when left out in the sun under high temperatures will not function; because all the chips
(semiconductors) overheat. It is to be noted that the efficiency and limitation of computer
chips is dependent upon dissipation of heat (temperature).
The structural integrity of the drone frame itself was another consideration.
Basically, a drone frame is like a foundation of a building, it supports all the flight
controller, motor, antennas, and the like. Brushless motors were chosen and are generally
used for drones because there are no sparks, which exist for brushed motors. Brushless
motors also provide the higher torque needed for propeller operation
Forensic detailed analysis and calculations of the obliterated drone to examine
every part of the broken components is very expensive. Electron microscopes, and other
equipment (calipers, tensile and shear, test machines, strain gages, data acquisition
system, and software programs etc.) which are needed for detailed examination of the
failed components and determination of failure loading were not available.
In addition, there were no gauges on the propellers themselves to calculate the
force on the propellers. The propeller assembly had three propellers (generally most do).
The exact loading on a propeller cannot be calculated due to several factors. The drone is
subject to wind drift both up and down and horizontally; even though one can have the
GPS unit on a hold mode. In addition, one blade may be shielded from the blast by the
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frame below. This means shock wave dynamic loading on the propeller will not be the
same for each propeller in the assembly, as also observed in field tests.
The best that could be done was to visually examine at the rupture and use
strength mechanics principles to diagnose the reason for the propeller failure. In addition,
the material of propellers is PC-ABS (PC-Polycarbonates are a group of thermoplastic
polymers containing carbonate groups in their chemical structures); (ABS is Acrylonitrile
Butadiene Styrene, a plastic that is a terpolymer, a polymer consisting of three different
monomers). These propellers are sold for drones under ambient conditions. The material
is a composite of plastic and ABS content and is a proprietary mix/composition, meaning
that other than the manufacturer, no stress tests, stress limits, shear limits, etc. can be
calculated using simple engineering principles. It is to be noted although pressure
readings were obtained, an elaborate system to yield results with mathematical exactitude
was not available.
If the propellers fail the drone cannot remain airborne. Alpha has 4 propellers
(quadcopter). For drones with more propellers, such as a six propellers (heptacopter), it is
possible for the heptacopter to still be airborne even if one of the propellers is lost.
As provided later, the propellers failed in shear and in bending (snapped profilelike the profile in a cold shear cut when fabricating steel and sheet metal). Another failure
mode was bending failure. This research suggests that the propeller manufacturer should
possibly incorporate carbon fibers in the PC-ABS during the manufacture process to
resist bending and shear or increase the thickness of the propeller at the blade and hub
junction- the area of high stress, a possible research project to be funded by the
manufacturer.
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The other significant component is the semiconductor components of the
microprocessor chip. The properties of semiconductors are detailed (in Appendix Y),
which describes how semiconductors function. By manipulating the properties of base
semiconductor material with dopants, properties are completely changed to allow control
of currents. No other research that is available has, based on our current knowledge,
tested the chips under explosive high temperature loadings for very short periods.
Semiconductors have a range of operating sustained temperature. Either side of the range,
semiconductor charges (electrons) are not moving, i.e. no current. Electrons are only
considered, although there are other components relevant to atoms such as protons,
phonons, neutrons, and other particles. Phonons are the next important item because
phonons are heat conductors. Heat in semiconductors is the Achilles heel of
semiconductors. As stated above, for more information on how semiconductors work, see
Appendix Y. Failure by heat transfer is however less likely than physical failure because
the explosion event is so fast that only a small amount of heat transfer occurs.
Explosive detonation generates overpressure and a shock wave that travels at
supersonic speeds. Explosives can also possibly create an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) a burst of electromagnetic energy, which may cause temporary loss of control and might
result in a reset. EMP creates surges of induced high current flow, and thus can cause
damage to unprotected electronic equipment such as an on board flight controller or
result in swamping of circuits as it is a small circuit board designed to operate on small
currents. Drone operations (yaw, pitch and roll described above) are governed by the
flight controller. It is to be noted that, although the electronic controls from the circuit
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board can function on a drone without propellers; the drone without propellers cannot
fly, even with a functioning circuit board.

6.2. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE EMISSION (EMP)
While this is not a nuclear explosion, the following discussion illustrates how
EMP works, and how induced currents are generated. A nuclear explosion produces
gamma rays, which interact with air molecules in a process called the Compton effect.
Electrons are scattered at high energies, which ionizes the atmosphere, generating a
powerful electrical field. (See Figure 6.1.) High explosives detonations are similar in that
large amounts of energy are liberated in a very short time frame, with ionized gases
which can result in similar electromagnetic effects. The nuclear bomb example in Figure
6.1 is used as an example of how EMP can be formed, but it is somewhat different for
explosives. High explosives create plasma, which is charged particles, and the movement
of charged particles causes electromagnetic radiation. It has been known for many years
that detonating explosives have been known to create EMP.
The electric field generated by EMP is picked up by metallic conductors such as
wires, or overhead power lines, acting as antennas that conduct the energy into the
electronic systems of cars, airplanes, or communications equipment. In this experiment,
no increase in the recorded current was observed. Hence, it is believed that there was no
induced current, perhaps due to the relatively small size of the drone and its electrical
isolation.
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Figure 6.1 How EMP Works
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6.3. HEAT FROM FIREBALL
The circuit’s temperature increased for a few microseconds due to the fireball
from the explosives. It was for a short duration as opposed to long duration. The INAV
software was used to test the MCU (microcontroller unit) after the explosives test, and
the circuit was still functional. For the short duration in contact with the fireball from the
explosive, there may not be enough time for the thermal conductivity to make enough
heat transfer for the temperature on the electronics to reach electronic breakdown, as
discussed in Appendix Y. Although soot was seen on the drone surfaces, the electronics
and electrical components were not affected.

6.4. DRONE COMPONENTS STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several components of the ALPHA drone were examined. The components used
are provided in Appendix F. They include flight controller, propellers, DC motors, frame,
etc.
6.4.1. Propeller Failure. Pictures in Section 4 show failure of propellers during
Test 10 in mid-air due to dynamic pressures from C4 detonation. Shown are the
propellers coming off when the drone was in the fireball. In the experiments, the
propellers failed in mid-air due to resulting loads from explosive detonation. The
propellers did not break when the drone hit the ground.
One of the key components looked at was the possible failure mechanisms of the
propellers. The propellers generally used are made of PC-ABS material - a brittle
material, not a ductile material.
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6.4.2. Failure of Propellers from Structural Point of View. Propellers are
mounted on the shaft of the brushless motor and held in place with a threaded nut. Figure
6.2 shows an intact propeller that was used in the tested drones. It shows the area where
the propeller fracture would occur. Figure 6.3 shows a side view of the same area.

Figure 6.2 Unmounted Propeller (Overview And Fracture Location)

Figure 6.3 Side View Of Propeller (Fracture Location)
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Figure 6.4 shows the propeller on the shaft of the brushless motor on the
actual drone.

Figure 6.4 Propeller On The Shaft Of Brushless Motor

In Test 10 (when the drone was incapacitated), the propellers were broken in the
air due to the explosion. Figure 6.5 can be compared to Figure 6.4 to see where the
propellers broke.

Figure 6.5 Propeller-Motor Shaft Connection; Reconstruction Of Propeller Assembly
From Test # 10
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Figure 6.6 shows another angle of where the propellers broke after Test 10.
Figure 6.7 shows a close up of the broken propellers. It can be seen that the propellers
where broken at the junction to the motor mount.

Figure 6.6 Propeller And Motor Mount (First Arm)

Figure 6.7 Close Up Of Failure Pattern Of Propellers (Propeller A, Two Blades That
Broke Near The Junction Of The Propeller And Motor Shaft)
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Figure 6.8 shows a close up of the arm on the drone where the propeller
blades broke off (after Test 10).

Figure 6.8 Motor Anatomy After Propellers Damaged

Figure 6.9 shows a different arm on the drone after Test 10. In this arm, two
blades of the propeller remained attached, but were damaged by the fall to the ground.
The propellers did not break when the drone hit the ground. When the drone hits the
ground, the propellers are spinning and as they hit, the loading is along the cross section
of the blade, which is stronger.
The propellers which remained intact, experienced edge damage (Figure 6.9). The
reason why some propellers were not broken was because not all the propellers were
subjected to the same explosive loads because the drone was drifting. All blades do not
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have identical strength due to manufacturing discrepancies and the explosion forces
on the blades may be different due to shielding from the motor stations and drone frame,
as the propellers are on the top and explosion beneath.

Figure 6.9 Damage To Propeller From Fall To The Ground (Second Arm)

For purposes of structural analysis, each propeller can be considered a cantilever
with fixed end at the shaft and propeller mounting. The propellers were subject to shock
pressures from below the drone when the drone was in air.
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Figure 6.10 shows the explosive residue on the bottom of the propellers.
Explosive residue was at the bottom of the frame, but the frame was not destroyed as
shown in Figure 6.11.

Figure 6.10 Propeller Residue (Propeller B, Only One Of Two Blades That Failed At The
Motor And Propeller Junction Shown; The Failure Pattern For These Blades Was
Identical)

After Test 10, two distinct patterns were observed for the propellers. The first
pattern (Propeller A) shows that the residue deposit was uniformly distributed, as in
Figure 6.7. So, for the first instance, for purposes of structural analysis the propeller (a
cantilever) is considered as subject to uniform pressure loading along the length of the
propeller.
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Figure 6.11 Bottom Of Frame Residue

In the second instance (Propeller B), from the residue pattern near the tip of the
propeller, the failure profile was different than the first instance, but consistent. As seen
in Figure 6.10, the residue pattern deposit was for a short distance from the tip along the
length of the propeller, indicating the uniform load for a short distance at the far end of
the propeller motor shaft. The explosive dynamic load as evidenced by the residue was
heaviest near the tip of the propeller. The loads were only near the tip, which means the
propeller was partially loaded near the tip. The dynamic load can be compared to a point
load at the end of the cantilever. This point load times the length of the propeller is the
bending moment exerted at the junction where the propeller failed because of insufficient
cross section area to resist tensile bending moment stresses.
It is believed in the Propeller B instance the total load on the propeller exceeded
shear capacity of the propeller cross section at a short distance from the propeller motor
shaft junction resulting in a straight clean fracture, as shown in Figure 6.10. In the
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Propeller A instance, the failure profile shows some bending and it is believed there
was insufficient section modulus (a cross section area for design of beams or flexural
members) to resist the bending moment, as shown in Figure 6.7. Section modulus is
applied for determination of yield points of materials. For example, the elastic section
modulus of a rectangle is bh2/6. By definition, the yield moment is equal to the elastic
section modulus times dy, the yield strength of the material. In our case, the propellers are
made of plastic and brittle. There is no plastic deformation and it is a brittle failure. The
yield strength of the propeller made of composites is not available because the material
composition of PC-ABS is proprietary. PC-ABS is a thermoplastic blend with several
components and is used for many industrial uses. Albeit, there are ASTM standards (such
as ASTM-D 638), but these are for pure materials, and not applicable for a blend.
The failure area dimensions were measured with Husky digital calipers and
dimensions of the failed propeller blades are shown in Figure 6.12.
The propeller is a brittle material, not an elastic material. It does not return to its
original position after application of explosive detonation load. The tensile stress of the
propeller at the motor shaft and the propeller junction would be more useful to a
manufacturer of the propellers’ design to withstand explosive loads. A suggested method
to strengthen the joint would be impregnating the propeller junction with carbon fiber or
other materials to withstand tensile stresses.
Further research is required to structurally model the propeller blades and their
junction with the motor shaft, loading on the propeller blades that lead to the failure of
the blades and to determine the failure stresses and the modes of failure (tensile,
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torsional, and any evidence of spallation). Further research can also yield a factor of
safety for the failure of propeller blades.

Figure 6.12 Failure Planes

The key parameter for evaluation of propellers, which can be of various sizes, is
the dynamic pressure load. There was no experimental reflective pressure measurement
from the wearable sensor at 3ft. The reason is because the wearable sensor is expensive,
and since this is a destructive test, the wearable sensor would have been destroyed. In
order to see a range of reflective pressures, experimental pressures were compared with
theoretical reflective pressures. Refer to Figure 5.5. where comparison of theoretical and
actual pressure is shown. As the two, theoretical and experimental, were in general
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agreement, the theoretical pressure of 500 psi was used as a basis for the failure of the
blade propellers at 3 ft.
6.4.3. GPS and 2.8GHz Antenna. Both the GPS unit and two antennas broke off
from their mountings. The GPS was shorn off from its housing in midair. The ALPHA
drone has two types of antennas. Two of the three were 2.8 GHz antennas for RF control.
(see Appendix F). The third antenna operates at 5.8 GHz and is used for video
transmission. Only one of the two 2.4 GHz antennas broke because of non-uniform
pressure distribution of the dynamic load. The two antennas were in different places but
symmetric. The dynamic pressure dislodged the GPS and the 5.8 GHz antenna. (See
Figure 6.13 to see the GPS unit separated from the drone frame after Test 10.) It is
difficult to discern whether the GPS came off at the shock wave impact, or after. The 2.8
GHz antenna is shown connected to the frame before Test 10 in Figure 6.14, and shown
after Test 10 in Figure 6.15.

Figure 6.13 GPS Unit Shorn Off
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Figure 6.14 2.8 GHz Antenna

6.4.4. Frame. The frame of the ALPHA drone was carbon fiber, which has a
higher strength than plastic frames. The frame was exposed to shock pressures, as
evidenced by explosives residue (see Figure 6.11). It did not experience any damage from
the dynamic wave pressures (see Figure 6.14). Only when the drone hit the ground did
the frame experience some minor damage (scratches).

6.5. PREDICTABILITY OF DRONE KNOCKOUT PRESSURE FOR VARIOUS
AMOUNTS OF EXPLOSIVES AND RULES OF THUMB
The drone was knocked out and incapacitated at 3ft. The amount of C4 explosives
used was 0.5 lb. The theoretical and experimental values were compared for peak
reflective pressure in Section 5 and found to be very similar for 8ft and above. Therefore,
the equations in Section 5 derived from theoretical values are used to construct a graph
for intermediate values of explosive weights and knockout drone heights. This
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information has tactical importance. It is known from Test 10 that the pressure needed
to disable the alpha drone was about 500 psi. The distance for the same pressure for
different amounts of explosives can be found. A model to predict the elevation of a drone
vs. the amount of explosives which will disable a drone is proposed.

Figure 6.15 Drone Frame After Test 10 With Antenna Broken Off

This information can be very useful in several practical scenarios. One scenario
envisions detection of explosives. Los Alamos Lab in 2006 developed a method to detect
explosives using bees. Instead of bees, drones can be used to detect explosives. The
Alpha drone could be equipped with explosive detective sensors and if it remains above
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the standoff distance of 3 ft for 0.5 lbs of C4, the drone can collect data/observations
on the explosive and still survive should an explosion occur. Another scenario would be
the drone being used to fire a projectile to blow up explosives at a certain distance
without affecting the drone. Having a known minimum standoff distance is important for
getting closer to an object of inspection for accuracy, while still being safe (e.g. EOD
applications). The closer you are, the better the accuracy and probability of the achieved
result, but also the higher probability of losing the drone.
The equations developed for safe standoff distance can be helpful for making
these decisions. With these equations developed by Sudhakar-Contreras (see Appendix
Z), one can predict the height the drone will be destroyed based on the amount of
explosives and the drone may be damaged by striking an object due to flight instability.
From the analysis, the safe height (standoff) for the drone with no obstruction
(based on the pressure in Test 10, drone at 3ft) as a function of weight of explosives is
provided by Equation (1), the unobstructed case. Equation (2) provides the safe height for
a drone from striking objects (obstructed case). In these two equations, two terms of
exponential (x and x^2) were used. Adding a second order term of an exponential (x^2)
gives more precise representation of an exponential function. For practical reasons, only
two terms were used, albeit third order and fourth order terms could have been included.
Unobstructed
y = -57511e-0.0000067827x + 57515e-0.000000070063x^2

(1)

Obstructed
y = 16e0.011x - 9.5e-0.0255x^2

(2)

Figure 6.16 Rule Of Thumb #1
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In the above equations, y is the standoff distance for safe height in feet, x is
the amount of C4 explosives in lbs. Graphical representations of Equations (1) and (2) are
provided in Appendix Z.
Simplified rules of thumb for safe standoff for first responders’ field use are
provided below. These simple rules of thumb for unobstructed and obstructed scenarios
were developed for sUAS safety for first responders, emergency personnel, and
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel’s use in the safe execution of their
responsibilities and duties. The rules of thumb provide useful information to first
responders and police activities deploying explosives and determine heights which they
need to fly a drone for drone safety and heights to avoid collision or encounters with
natural (trees, hills) or manmade objects (power lines, electric poles, buildings, and the
like).
6.5.1. Rule of Thumb #1. A safe height from C4 explosive for the sUAS
operation for Equation (1) presented as a rule of thumb in feet, developed by SudhakarContreras1, is 6 + (weight of C4 explosives)/5 (ft) (Rule of Thumb #1). The simplified
form of this equation is 6 + 0.2*(weight of C4 explosives). The rule of thumb is shown in
Figure 6.16. The rule of thumb uses the pressure based on Test 10 where the drone was
incapacitated at 3ft. This rule of thumb was developed to include a buffer/safety zone
above the elevation where a drone can be incapacitated. A factor of safety of
approximately 2.0 was used to arrive at 6.1 ft. By comparison, airplane components have
a factor of safety between 1.5 and 2.5 (The Engineering Toolbox, 2010).

1

Sergio Contreras is a senior member of ATACT under supervision of the author (Sudhakar).
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Table 6.1 Table For Rule Of Thumb #1 For Drone Safe Standoff Distance Simplified
For Field Use
Amount of Explosives (lbs of C4)

Safe Standoff Distance (ft) (Rounded Up)

0.5-5

7

5-10

8

10-15

9

15-20

10

20-25

11

25-30

12

30-40

14

40-50

16

Figure 6.17 Simplified Rule Of Thumb #1 – No Obstruction

Figure 6.17 shows a simplified version of the rule of thumb and Table 6.1 shows
the rule of thumb in tabular form.
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The rule of thumb was developed to be consistent with the motivation for this
research and for flight of heights 50ft and below. The experiments were conducted up to
a height of 50 ft. This equation holds for safe distances for sUAS up to 50 ft
(approximately 5 stories high). For beyond 50 ft, additional experiments are needed to
develop a mathematical equation for a best fit line.
Regarding the Kingery Bulmesh equation, the pressures fall off as the distance is
increased for a given weight of explosives. Five stories is considered a practical sUAS
operational height for first responders. Beyond 50 ft, other methods by first responders
may be needed for deployment of measures for reconnaissance of threats and
countermeasures. High rise buildings (greater than 75ft) present evacuation problems and
firefighting issues.
6.5.2. Rule of Thumb #2. Rule of thumb #1 provides standoff distance for the
safety of the drones. A second rule of thumb is provided to supplement rule of thumb #1
and provides useful additional information that first responders and police activities
deploying explosives may consider. It is possible that while the drone may not be
destroyed even if it stays above the safe standoff distance (Rule of Thumb #1), it still
may be possible for the drone to be damaged. It will be pushed upwards by the explosive
shock wave and may collide with other overhead objects, either man made or natural.
Also, the drone comes down because of the vacuum created behind the shock wave. Rule
of Thumb #2 provides the envelope height above which is the safe flight zone for a
drone, to avoid collision with objects.

Figure 6.18 Rule of Thumb #2
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Table 6.2 Rules Of Thumb #2 For Safe Flight Envelope Distance For Commercially
Available sUAS Simplified For Field Use
Explosive weight (we)(in lbs)

Drone Safe Flight Envelope (ft)
12 + (2*we/5) (Rounded Up)

0.5-1

13

1-5

14

5-10

16

10-15

18

15-20

20

20-25

22

25-30

24

30-40

28

40-50

32

Figure 6.19 Simplified Rule Of Thumb #2 - Obstruction
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Rule of Thumb #2 is 12+ 0.4*(weight of C4 explosives). Rule of thumb #2 is
shown in Figure 6.18. Table 6.2 provides a quick glance of the drone safe flight envelope
distance simplified for field use. Figure 6.19 can be compared to Table 6.2 for
convenience.

Table 6.3 Explosion Effects on Drone Flight
Drone Height

Explosive Effects on Drone

1

2

3

4

Test (ft)

Height at Which Drone

Ascension Height (ft)

Drop Height (ft)

5.7

N/A. Drone

Destroyed (ft)
3

4.33

destroyed.
4

N/A. Drone not destroyed.

5

1.0.

5

N/A. Drone not destroyed.

1.25

0.6. However, the
drone pilot brought
the drone down at
the ground
elevation.

8

10
12

N/A. Drone not destroyed.

N/A. Drone not destroyed.
N/A. Drone not destroyed.

N/A. Drone was

N/A. Drone drifted

drifting at the time of

from the view of

explosion.

the camera.

N/A. Datum not

N/A. Datum not

visible.

visible.

0

0

The envelope was developed using conservative values from Table 6.3. From the
table, the maximum ascension (wobble) was 5.7 ft, and the descent from this elevation
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was approximately 1 ft. This maximum 5.7 ft ascension value is used as a
conservative value to predict drone safe envelope distance.

6.6. DRONE CAMERAS
Even though the ALPHA drone has the capability to carry a camera, it was not
equipped with the camera for these experiments because the violent movements of the
blasts would not yield meaningful photographs. Most of the low cost drones have
cameras, but do not have the necessary zoom capabilities for inspecting from long
distances. This means drones must fly close to the explosives for inspection. As long as
they stay above minimum standoff distances, (see Sudhakar-Contreras graph in Appendix
Z), the drones can survive C4 detonations.

6.7. DETECTION OF EXPLOSIVES BY SENSORS
There is no off the shelf explosive detection sensor that is available. However,
recent research indicates trace detection of RDX, HMX and PETN using a fluorescence
spot sensor is possible. This research is funded by the Department of Homeland Security,
Science, and Technology Directorate under grant number (209-ST-108-LR0005), NSF
(CHE 0931466) and the USTAR program of the University of Utah (Wang et. al., 2016).
According to this research, other than solution-based media, the detection of RDX, HMX,
and PETN is difficult because of low volatility and weak electron withdrawing ability.
The authors suggest quenching the explosives with UV Radiation <365nm, and
measuring the NO2 emissions which result from exposure of these explosives to UV.
(See Figures 6.19 and 6.20). There are NO2 sensors by SPEC Sensors (Spec Sensors,
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2019) which are ultrathin electrochemical sensors measuring 20x20x3.8mm and
weighing less than 2 ounces. To have a comprehensive sensor, a source of UV is needed
for photolysis of RDX and PETN to produce NO2 and NO2+. A good solution for
development of an explosive sensor is some sort of an arrangement with AMS company
(AMS, 2019). This company is an Australian based company and specifically develops
sensors with focuse on miniaturization, integration, accuracy, sensitivity, and low power
usage. So, in summary, a full fledged off the shelf explosive sensor will require
substantial resources, and time for development. Explosive detection could be done in
stages by using the methods suggested in the Department of Homeland Security funded
research.

Figure 6.20 Molecular Structure Of RDX, HMX, PETN (Wang et. al., 2016)
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Figure 6.21 Chemical Composition Of Common Explosives

6.8. FIRST RESPONDERS
First responders, by their jurisdiction and duties are the first ones to arrive at a site
to respond to threats and protection of personnel and environment. First responders are
those individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection
and preservation of life, property, evidence and the environment, including emergency
response providers, as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as well
as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled
support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services
during prevention, response, and recovery operations. (Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/ HSPD–8—National Preparedness December 17, 2003).
The first responders are the first ones to be present at a location to evaluate the
threat that will require law enforcement services. Single or multiple Improvised
Explosive Device, or IED, (see Figure 6.21) events targeting civilians and/or first
responders represent an ongoing and growing threat from domestic and foreign
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individuals or groups (Haupt et. al. 2004). In the United States between 1970 and
2011, (excluding the 9/11 attacks), four of six attacks with more than 50 injuries, and 22
of 45 attacks with more than five injuries, involved IEDs. Three IED “types” likely to
cause mass casualties include “leave behind” parcels, backpacks, or luggage placed in
crowded environments; “suicide vests” or “suicide belts”; and especially vehicle bombs.
Traumatic injuries may result from IEDs in many ways: from penetration or blunt force
trauma caused by the fragmentation and high-velocity projection of pieces of their
immediate container (e.g., a metal pipe, box, or pressure cooker); from items
intentionally added to compound the number of projectiles (e.g., ball bearing, nails, etc.);
from incidental fragmentation and projection of material or debris from a larger container
or vessel the IED is placed within (e.g., a vehicle trunk or trash bin); by collateral
fragmentation and/or projection of material affected by the blast, such as windows, walls,
or other objects in the vicinity; and by blast overpressure itself, without any projectiles at
all. Where an IED is placed—indoors or out, near or far from other objects—will
influence its blast effects. Understanding the numerous ways in which IEDs can cause
injuries and how the environment plays a role in exacerbating or mitigating their blast
effects is critical to increasing survivability when unexploded IEDs are present or
secondary IEDs are suspected. “In addition to causing life and limb threatening injuries,
these events generate confusion, uncertainty, and fear at the scene that ripple throughout
the receiving medical system” (DHS, June 2015).
More likely than not, first responders don’t have adequate knowledge of the site,
circumstances, and other factors to address and respond threats. Judgement calls have to
be made. How should the criminal activity site be secured before sending the law
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enforcement team? Understanding of ballistics is widely known, but the
understanding of explosives is not that broad. Because of the lethality of explosives, one
has to move with abundant precaution.

Figure 6.22 Materials Used In IDEs From 1991 To 1996

There are couple of ways that laws can be enforced. First, the responders can
physically enter the premises, exposing the responders to extreme risk of death and
injuries from criminal activity. A preferred method is to evaluate the premises remotely
and keep the first responders from harm’s way. The remote evaluation can be conducted
by a drone. However, a drone has to be at a safe distance (standoff distance) to ensure the
drone providing data is itself safe from destruction. This research provides a valuable
method to evaluate a threat from distance. This approach was successfully used by police
in Daytona Beach, Florida, as reported on September 24, 2019 (Lee, September 24,
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2019). Guests at the Ocean Breeze Club Hotel were ordered to evacuate because a
man threatened to set off a grenade in his room. The police flew a drone outside the hotel,
assessed the threat and followed up the threat with appropriate action. Daytona Beach
established an unmanned aviation unit in 2017 in collaboration with Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University. Another use of a drone as contemplated by this research was a
standoff at Denny’s in Campbell, California (Hollister, February 24, 2019). It is to be
noted that the drone was flown below 50 ft.
First Responders, with some knowledge of safe standoff distances for their
drones, can approach an unmarked drone to detect explosives - a possible solution to the
FAA’s concern expressed in recent regulations regarding unmarked drones (Federal
Register - Federal Register, Vol 84, February 13, p 3670). In addition, as the technology
advances, drones can be fitted with IR sensors, which can provide heat signature, (with
some limitations), of the occupant inside the premises under observation and suspected
location of criminal activity.
In addition, this first of a kind research can be used to build on other enforcement
and first responder assistance tools. Modifications to a commercial drone and perhaps a
different type of drone may be necessary. As an example, police operations may require
launching of an explosive device as the most practical method to defeat criminal
activities. Before drones were in vogue, Mayor Good of Philadelphia in 1985 authorized
the dropping of a device in a building suspected of criminal activities (Stevens, W., May
14, 1985). While this research focuses on explosives and drones, drones can be used by
first responders to carry out their duties and responsibilities. An example would be
monitoring an industrial complex (maybe a refinery or manufacturing facility)
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immediately after explosions, the causes of which are unknown. Because of
possibilities of subsequent explosions, a drone can conduct surveillance operations with
adequate standoff distance. Recently, British petroleum (BP) conducted monitoring
operations of methane (a highly explosive gas) emissions of an offshore platform
(Rattigan, K., September 26, 2019).

6.9. IMPLICATIONS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT – SAFE OPERATIONS
This research provides first responders, police and other law enforcement entities
simple, easy- to- understand effects of explosive detonations on sUAS for two likely
threat situations. In the first threat situation, in the assessment of a potential crime scene,
first responders are likely to encounter packages containing explosives. To better
understand the threat, the first responder’s sUAS needs to be piloted close to the package.
How close should the sUAS be to an explosive before it is destroyed by explosive
detonation? This research provides an easy-to-use safe/unsafe zone envelop and safe
standoff distance to prevent drone destruction. Thus, facilitating the development by first
responders to defeat the threat quickly.
In the event the explosives are detonated and even if the sUAS is in a safe
standoff distance zone to prevent destruction, the detonation can cause deviation of the
flight path so that it strikes objects (power lines, trees, building, overhangs, etc.) in its
forced path, as a result of momentary loss of flight control. In this situation, the sUAS
may be damaged, its capability is compromised, and rendered inoperable, although, it
may be recoverable. This research provides a second safe/unsafe zone envelop to be used
by first responders to avoid this situation.
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Another implication of this research finding is that sUASs are robust, small
targets, and the use of explosives to take out drones is not efficient. Alternate methods to
take out drones will possibly provide better results.
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7. CONCLUSION

Based upon experiments and engineering principles, the following is concluded:
1. The Alpha drone was found to be surprisingly robust and resistant to explosion
forces.
2. No indication of any affect caused by EMP was noted during testing. EMP from
high explosive charges is unlikely to be an issue with a drone since it may be
hardened by its size and electrical isolation (the drones are not grounded).
3. The drone was subjected to a high temperature, due to the fireball, for a very
short time (microseconds). The very short duration of high temperatures was not
sufficient to cause enough heat transfer to raise the temperature of the
semiconductors above operating limits.
4. Increasing the amount of explosives will cause the drone to fail at higher
elevations.
5. The propellers broke at 3 ft above the detonation of 0.5 pounds of C-4 as a result
of approximately 500 psi reflective pressure because the tensile strength of the
propeller material was exceeded at the juncture of the propellers at the motor
shaft connections. This juncture is a newly identified weak point for explosion
loading from below.
6. One of the two 2.8 GHz receiver antennas broke from blast pressure on the drone
at 3 ft from the blast. (See Figure 4.13). Two antennas are needed for receiving
synchronized signals from manual controls from the pilot. Although one antenna
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was broken, the drone was disoriented. The drone was unable to receive
synchronized control signals from the pilot.
7. The GPS unit mounted on the ALPHA was dislodged from its GPS housing in
the ALPHA at 3 ft from the blast. (See Figures 4.12 and 4.13). A beefed up GPS
housing is required for ALPHA drones.
8.

The frame of the ALPHA drone was not damaged. The drone frame remained
intact after Test 10 (drone height of 3 ft) and requires no further modifications
for the ALPHA drone.

9. While the wiring was not damaged or ripped because of the detonation (in all
tests), attachments of the wires to the frame need to be reinforced because of
violent movements that will be experienced in explosive conditions.
10. The reflective pressures ranged from 1.4 to 3 times the incident pressure. The
drone design should incorporate a loading of three times the incident pressure
loading.
11. Equations were developed from the analyses to predict reflective pressures or the
other way around, as given in Section 5.5.
12. Beyond the 10ft test, the percent deviation between the experimental and
Kingery-Bulmash theoretical reflective pressures ranged from -37.57% to
25.25%. The transition in percent deviation between 20 and 30 ft is expected due
to the clipping of high frequency peaks at lower elevations.
13. At an elevation of 12 ft and above there was no discernable effect in the
ALPHA’s flight characteristics during the detonation of 0.5lbs of C4.
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14. The ALPHA drone was destroyed in the air during its flight at 3ft but from
4ft and above, the drone survived and remained above the ground even when
affected (sucked down) by the vacuum created by the explosion.
15. From the test data a semiempirical/theoretical equation was developed to predict
a minimum standoff zone for varying explosive charge weights below which the
drone would be incapacitated.
16. The height at which the drone was seen to cope with the turbulence from the
explosion of 0.5 lb of C4 and still maintain a steady hover varied with different
heights. For example, at 3ft away from the explosive, 12ft was the distance at
which the drone would not experience turbulence.
17. The surrounding environment is more important and likely to damage the sUAS
than the explosive.
18. A similar equation was also developed to predict minimum standoff distance for
minimal flight disruption during an explosion event beneath to avoid
collisions/damage with objects either natural or man-made.

130
8. FUTURE RESEARCH

The following research topics as suggested below emanate from the findings in
Section 6.
•

The response of drones to elevated spherical charges. The current research tested
drones subject to hemispherical charges on the ground below the drone in flight.
The response of the drones may be different if the detonation is at the same level,
not below, the drone. This situation would arise if an explosive is detonated at the
same level of a drone being used to detect explosives, such as an airborne threat.

•

The response of drones to charges above the drone. This situation would provide
further understanding if an explosive is dropped from above the drone while the
drone was conducting investigatory activities or to assess the vulnerability of
drones to knockout from above.

•

A drone swarm subject to explosive loads. This situation would arise in the event
criminal enterprises use several drones to advance their criminal objectives.

•

The response of drone components fabricated from other materials, such as drone
propellers impregnated with carbon fibers. This study would provide guidelines
and suggested specifications for acquisition of drones used in explosive
environments.

•

Testing of common drones from different manufacturers. While no endorsement
of any particular manufacturer is suggested, a comparison chart for acquisition/
procurement of drones from the test results will assist clients/entities acquiring
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drones for explosive environments and help identify components and
construction that is a) weak and b) strong with respect to the application of
explosion forces.
•

The survivability of individual components subject to explosive detonation loads
in non flight (stationary) mode to record and evaluate the response. The
components suggested are drone frame, propellers, motors, flight controller, GPS
housings, antennas, connections and housings of drone components. Stationary
testing will allow the use of exact standoffs with more precise and extensive
instrumentation.

•

Test the responses (flight controllers) of various sizes of drones to explosive
blasts, especially for heat effects, and potentially adding heat sinks for explosive
armoring. The test results will lead to improved fastening and anchoring of these
components to the drone frame.

•

The frame materials for drones need to be tested in explosive loading. The frame
provides a foundation to support all the components and strength during drone
operations. The lighter the materials, the lighter the frame, and the more
endurance/capabilities the drone will have.

•

The experiments conducted in this research use C4. In the future other explosives
need to be tested and compared with the C4 experiments from this research.

•

The testing of drones for firing or deploying explosives and other devices, such as
projectiles, even though not currently permitted by regulations. This research will
help understand the impact on the drone operation in flight when a projectile is

132
fired from the drone. This would be useful for both law enforcement and
military uses.
•

Investigate drones as an additional tool for explosives detection in agreement with
the Principles of Homeland Security Guide for selection of explosives and blast
mitigation equipment for emergency first responders.

•

Experimental testing of drone operations in underground mining. Underground
mining poses challenges of communications between the operator and the drone.
Underground mines pose hazards and a dangerous environment and drones could
possibly alleviate exposure of underground mine workers to these hazards.

•

Test drones under explosive conditions using instrumentation and equipment and
sensors with more resolution and more samples per second to yield more precise
results. These quantitative results will assist in furthering the development of
specifications for materials and understanding of failure mechanisms
quantitatively.
The proposed items will further the understanding of uses of sUAS for law

enforcement and provide enforcement authorities additional simple tools and rules of
thumb for their ready use in their day to day activities
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APPENDIX A.
MILITARY DRONES AT CREECH AFB PREDATOR & REAPER
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(Photos by Ashok EM Sudhakar by permission)

Predator
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(Photos by Ashok EM Sudhakar by permission)

Reaper
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APPENDIX B.
WEAPONS TRENDS IN TERRORISM
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(Global Terrorism Index 2015 Figure 11)

Explosives Trends in Terror
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APPENDIX C.
COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE DRONES
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DJ Mavic 2

140

Maverick Pro Platinum

141

Phantom 4 Pro

142

Inspire 2

143

Matrice 600

144

Agras MG-1S

145

Typhoon H

146

Tornado H920 Plus

147

H520 Plus

148

Halo Stealth

149

eBee

150

Nova

151

Aerigon MK II

152

Alta 8

153

Griff 135

154

Erida

155

Intel Falcon 8+

156

US-1
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APPENDIX D.
POLICY PROCESS MODEL
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STAGE OF THE
PROCESS
Agenda setting

Policy formulation

Policy legitimation

Policy
implementation

The Policy Process Model
WHAT IT MEANS
How problems are perceived and
defined, command attention, and
get onto the political agenda.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Budget deficits rose
sharply on the agenda
during the Obama
administration as they
increased dramatically due
to a combination of events,
including the economic
downturn and increased
federal expenditures to
stimulate the economy.
Many Republicans stated
the increased deficit was
due to increased
expenditures rather than a
decrease in revenues.
The design and drafting of policy
The 2001 tax cut reflected
goals and strategies for achieving conflicting economic
them. Often involves the use of
assumptions and forecasts
policy analysis.
and differing estimates of
future impacts on domestic
programs.
The mobilization of political
The passage of health care
support and formal enactment of
reform in 2010 saw intense
policies. Includes justification or
lobbying on the part of
rationales for the policy action.
many of the affected
interests. Ultimately the
bill was passed in the face
of unanimous Republican
opposition because
Democratic supporters
argued that the reform plan
would provide for better
health coverage for most
citizens.
Provision of institutional resources Implementation of the
for putting the programs into
federal Endangered
effect within a bureaucracy.
Species Act has lagged for
years because of
insufficient funding, which
reduced its effectiveness.
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Policy and program
evaluation

Measurement and assessment of
policy and program effects,
including success or failure.

Policy change

Modification of policy goals and
means in light of new information
or shifting political environment.

Efforts to measure the
effectiveness of the 1996
welfare reform policy and
of the experimental use of
vouchers to improve public
education have produced
mixed results.
Adoption of new national
security, airport security,
and immigration reforms
following the terrorist
attacks of 2001.
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APPENDIX E.
WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN DO TO PROMOTE OR THWART A POLICY
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ACTION
Regulate

Subsidize
Ration
Tax and Spend

Contract Out

Use market
incentives

Privatize

Charge fees
Educate

Create public
trusts
Conduct
research

What Government Can Do
ILLUSTRATIONS
Licensing, inspection, enforcement of standards, application of
sanctions
Specific examples: environmental, health, and workplace safety
regulations; corporate financial regulations
Loans, direct payments or benefits, tax credits, price supports
Specific examples: student loans, subsidies to farmers; dairy price
supports; low-interest loans for disaster recovery
Limit access to scarce resources
Tax an activity at a level that encourages or discourages it
Specific examples: allowing home mortgage deductions to encourage
home ownership; imposing cigarette taxes to discourage smoking
Spend money on preferred programs
Specific examples: defense weapons, prisons, AmeriCorps, public
higher education
Contract for government services from the private sector or buy
products for government agencies
Specific examples: contracts for defense weapons procurement and
for economic rebuilding efforts after wars; purchase of computers
and fleet vehicles for federal or state governments or public schools
A special category of taxation or imposition of fees that creates
incentives to change behavior and achieve goals and objectives
Specific examples: raising gasoline taxes to encourage conservation
of fuel and reduce carbon dioxide emissions; tax rebates for
purchasing hybrid vehicles or installing solar or wind power sources
Transferring public services from government to the private sector
Specific examples: turning over management of public schools to
private companies; partially privatizing the Social Security system by
allowing individuals to manage a portion of their retirement savings
Fees for select services
Specific examples: hunting and fishing licenses; requiring students to
pay to ride the school bus; college tuition
Provide information to the public through formal programs or other
actions
Specific examples: formal public meetings; public education
services; food safety labels; information on toxic chemical releases;
automobile fuel efficiency labels
Holding public property in trust for citizens indefinitely
Specific examples: local land conservation trusts; state and national
parks and recreation areas
Conduct or support research and development
Specific examples: National Science Foundation support for
academic studies; defense and environmental research; medical
science research through the National Institutes of Health
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APPENDIX F.
DRONE SPECIFICATIONS
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Drone Anatomy
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Parts and Components 1

165

Parts and Components 2
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Parts and Components 3
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Pictorial Wiring Diagram
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Terminology
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APPENDIX G.
PROPELLER DYNAMICS
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Propeller Dynamics
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APPENDIX H.
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
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Electromagnetic Spectrum
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APPENDIX I.
DRONES MANUFACTURED BY ACADEMY OF THREAT ASSESSMENTS
COUNTERMEASURES AND TECHNOLOGY
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Z7Drones Model Summary
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APPENDIX J.
ANATOMY OF TERROR
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APPENDIX K.
SUMMARY OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE
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APPENDIX L.
CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FUTURE CIVILIAN AND COMMERCIAL USES
FOR SMALL UAS
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APPENDIX M.
STATE LAWS FOR DRONES
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Source https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws/
Alabama https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-alabama/
Alaska https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-alaska/
Arizona https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-arizona/
Arkansas https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-arkansas/
California https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-california/
Colorado https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-colorado/
Connecticut https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-connecticut/
Delaware https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-delaware/
Florida https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-florida/
Georgia https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-georgia/
Hawaii https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-hawaii/
Idaho https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-idaho/
Illinois https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-illinois/
Indiana https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-indiana/
Iowa https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-iowa/
Kansas https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-kansas/
Kentucky https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-kentucky/
Louisiana https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-louisiana/
Maine https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-maine/
Maryland https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-maryland/
Massachusetts https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-massachusetts/
Michigan https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-michigan/
Minnesota https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-minnesota/
Mississippi https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-mississippi/
Missouri https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-missouri/
Missouri Drone Regulations
Federal Drone Laws in Missouri
To fly a drone as a commercial pilot in the state of Missouri (i.e. for work / business
purposes) you are required to follow the requirements of the FAA’s Part 107 Small UAS
Rule (Part 107), which includes passing the FAA’s Aeronautical Knowledge Test to
obtain a Remote Pilot Certificate.
To fly a drone as a hobbyist in the state of Missouri (i.e. for fun / pleasure) you are
required to register your drone with the FAA and follow the FAA’s Special Rule for
Model Aircraft.
To fly a drone as a government employee in the state of Missouri (i.e., for a police or
fire department) you may either operate under the FAA’s Part 107 rule or obtain a
federal Certificate of Authorization (COA).
State Drone Laws in Missouri
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These are drone laws that apply to the entire state of Missouri, and were created by
the Missouri General Assembly.
According to the Missouri Department of Transportation and the Missouri General
Assembly there are currently no state laws in place concerning the operations of drones in
Missouri.
All drone pilots operating commercially in the state of Missouri are subject to the FAA’s
Part 107 rules. Learn more about the FAA’s certification process to obtain a commercial
drone license in this free guide.
Local Drone Laws in Missouri
These are drone laws that apply only to certain regions, cities, or counties within the state
of Missouri, and were created by various authorities within the state.
Jackson County – Ord. 1447, Ch 50 // 2015
This ordinance requires drone operators to have liability insurance and to obtain a permit
from Jackson County before operating a drone within any Jackson County park.
Additionally, any person operating a radio-controlled aircraft within designated areas in
Jackson County parks shall prominently display on the transmitter at all times frequency
flags and channel numbers. Also, no person shall operate any radio-controlled flying
device with a sound level in excess of 98 decibels on a weighted scale when measured
from a distance of 50 or more feet.
Montana https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-montana/
Nebraska https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-nebraska/
Nevada https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-nevada/
Federal Drone Laws in Nevada
To fly a drone as a commercial pilot in the state of Nevada (i.e. for work / business
purposes) you are required to follow the requirements of the FAA’s Part 107 Small UAS
Rule (Part 107), which includes passing the FAA’s Aeronautical Knowledge Test to
obtain a Remote Pilot Certificate.
To fly a drone as a hobbyist in the state of Nevada (i.e. for fun / pleasure) you are
required to register your dronewith the FAA and follow the FAA’s Special Rule for
Model Aircraft.
To fly a drone as a government employee in the state of Nevada (i.e., for a police or
fire department) you may either operate under the FAA’s Part 107 rule or obtain a
federal Certificate of Authorization (COA).
State Drone Laws in Nevada
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These are drone laws that apply to the entire state of Nevada, and were created by the
Nevada Legislature.
According to the Nevada Department of Transportation and the Nevada Legislature,
Nevada has one state-wide law concerning the use of drones in the state.
AB 239 // 2015
This law prohibits the weaponization of UAS, and the use of UAS within a certain
distance of critical facilities and airports without permission. This law also specifies
restrictions on the use of UAS by law enforcement and public agencies, and requires the
creation of a registry of all UAS operated by public agencies in the state.
All drone pilots operating commercially in the state of Nevada are subject to the FAA’s
Part 107 rules. Learn more about the FAA’s certification process to obtain a commercial
drone license in this free guide.
New Hampshire https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-new-hampshire/
New Jersey https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-new-jersey/
New Mexico https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-new-mexico/
New York https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-new-york/
North Carolina https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-north-carolina/
North Dakota https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-north-dakota/
Ohio https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-ohio/
Oklahoma https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-oklahoma/
Oregon https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-oregon/
Pennsylvania https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-pennsylvania/
Rhode Island https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-rhode-island/
South Carolina https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-south-carolina/
South Dakota https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-south-dakota/
Tennessee https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-tennessee/
Texas https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-texas/
Utah https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-utah/
Vermont https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-vermont/
Virginia https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-virginia/
Washington https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-washington/
West Virginia https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-west-virginia/
Wisconsin https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-wisconsin/
Wyoming https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-wyoming/
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APPENDIX N.
NYLONX CARBON FIBER FILAMENT TECH SHEET
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APPENDIX O.
INCIDENT PRESSURE SENSOR SPECS
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APPENDIX P.
REFLECTIVE PRESSURE SENSOR SPECS
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APPENDIX Q.
PHANTOM V2012 SPECS
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APPENDIX R.
RANGER II CAMERA SPECS

198

199

APPENDIX S.
DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM SPECS
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APPENDIX T.
REPRESENTATIVE REFLECTIVE PRESSURE RECORDED DATA AT 8FT
(SAMPLE)
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NOTE: There are six sensors and seven tests. This is a very large data file. Only a
representative sample of the data for one sensor for one test at 8ft is shown below.
Time(ms),Pressure(psi),
-3.200,-0.0510,
-3.190,-0.0510,
-3.180,-0.0510,
-3.170,-0.0510,
-3.160,-0.0510,
-3.150,-0.0510,
-3.140,0.0000,
-3.130,-0.0510,
-3.120,-0.0510,
-3.110,-0.0510,
-3.100,-0.0510,
-3.090,-0.0510,
-3.080,-0.0510,
-3.070,-0.1020,
-3.060,-0.0510,
-3.050,-0.0510,
-3.040,-0.0510,
-3.030,-0.0510,
-3.020,-0.1020,
-3.010,-0.1020,
-3.000,-0.1020,
-2.990,-0.0510,
-2.980,-0.0510,
-2.970,-0.0510,
-2.960,-0.0510,
-2.950,-0.0510,
-2.940,-0.0510,
-2.930,-0.1020,
-2.920,-0.1020,
-2.910,-0.1020,
-2.900,-0.0510,
-2.890,-0.0510,
-2.880,-0.0510,
-2.870,-0.0510,
-2.860,-0.0510,
-2.850,0.0000,
-2.840,-0.0510,
-2.830,0.0000,
-2.820,0.0000,
-2.810,0.0000,
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APPENDIX U.
RELATIONSHIP OF REFLECTIVE AND INCIDENT PRESSURES (FEMA 426)
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This figure shows that reflected pressures for explosive detonations can be almost 13
greater than peak incident pressures.
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APPENDIX V.
REPRESENTATIVE GRAPHS OF EXTRACTED DATA FROM WEARABLE
SENSORS WHEN DRONE AT 8FT
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SENSOR ON GROUND 50 FT AWAY FROM BLAST

OverPressure
Reflective Pressure (psi)

1.60
1.20
0.80
0.40
0.00
-0.40
-0.80
-3.200 -1.750 -0.300 1.150 2.600 4.050 5.500 6.950 8.400 9.850 11.30012.75014.200 15.650

Time (msec)
Data from Sensor on Ground 50ft Away When Drone 8 ft Above Blast

SENSOR ON GROUND 40 FT AWAY FROM BLAST

OverPressure
Reflective Pressure (psi)

1.60
1.20
0.80
0.40
0.00
-0.40
-0.80
-3.200 -1.750 -0.300 1.150 2.600 4.050 5.500 6.950 8.400 9.850 11.30012.75014.200 15.650

Time (msec)
Data from Sensor on Ground 40ft Away When Drone 8 ft Above Blast
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SENSOR 30 FT AWAY FROM BLAST

OverPressure
Reflective Pressure (psi)

3.00
2.25
1.50
0.75
0.00
-0.75
-1.50
-3.200 -1.750 -0.300 1.150 2.600 4.050 5.500 6.950 8.400 9.850 11.30012.75014.200 15.650

Time (msec)
Data from Sensor on Ground 30ft Away When Drone 8 ft Above Blast

SENSOR 20 FT AWAY FROM BLAST (DEFECTIVE SENSOR)

OverPressure
Reflective Pressure (psi)

1.20
0.90
0.60
0.30
0.00
-0.30
-0.60
-3.200 -1.750 -0.300 1.150 2.600 4.050 5.500 6.950 8.400 9.850 11.30012.75014.200 15.650

Time (msec)
Data from Sensor on Ground 20ft Away When Drone 8 ft Above Blast
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SENSOR 6 FT AWAY FROM BLAST

OverPressure
Reflective Pressure (psi)

30.00
24.00
18.00
12.00
6.00
0.00
-6.00
-3.200 -1.730 -0.260 1.210 2.680 4.150 5.620 7.090 8.560 10.030 11.50012.97014.440 15.910

Time (ms)
Data from Sensor on Ground 6ft Away When Drone 8 ft Above Blast

SENSOR ON DRONE WHEN DRONE 8FT ABOVE BLAST

OverPressure
Reflective Pressure (psi)

40.00

30.00

20.00

10.00

0.00

-10.00
-3.200 -1.730 -0.260 1.210 2.680 4.150 5.620 7.090 8.560 10.030 11.50012.970 14.44015.910

Time (msec)

Sensor on Drone When Drone 8 ft Above Blast
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APPENDIX W.
SAMPLE MATLAB SCRIPT
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M = csvread('hemisphere_testing_2.CSV');
t=M(:,1);
ch1=M(:,2);
ch2=M(:,3);
ch3=M(:,4);
ch4=M(:,5);
ch5=M(:,6);
ch7=M(:,7);
figure(8);
subplot(5,1,1);
plot(t,ch1);
xlabel('Time (s)');
ylabel('Pressure (psi)');
xlim([0 0.05]);
subplot(5,1,2);
plot(t,ch2);
xlabel('Time (s)');
ylabel('Pressure (psi)');
xlim([0 0.05]);
subplot(5,1,3);
plot(t,ch3);
xlabel('Time (s)');
ylabel('Pressure (psi)');
xlim([0 0.05]);
subplot(5,1,4);
plot(t,ch4);
xlabel('Time (s)');
ylabel('Pressure (psi)');
xlim([0 0.05]);
subplot(5,1,5);
plot(t,ch5);
xlabel('Time (s)');
ylabel('Pressure (psi)');
xlim([0 0.05]);
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APPENDIX X.
KINGERY BULMASH ONLINE CALCULATOR
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APPENDIX Y.
HOW SEMICONDUCTORS WORK
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Almost all solid state devices are fabricated from semi-conductors. A majority of
components on a drone are solid state devices (flight controller, GPS, cameras, SD cards
and the like). A brief discussion of semiconductor follows.
There are two current carrying entities within the semiconductors, which are
electrons and holes. An energy bond model is used to describe current flow and
characteristics of a semiconductor. Detailed discussion of the energy band model and
physics is outside the scope of this discussion but a brief concepts are provided (Pierret,
1996).
Basically, the energy band model is two energy bands valence band and
conduction band separated by a band gap. In the band gap there are no allowed states. In
an atomic structure there are only specific quantized states where electrons can exist. In
silicon, the most widely used semiconductor material, there are 14 Si-electrons, 10 of
them are tightly bound to the nucleus of the atom. Germanium is the other used
semiconductor material with 28 electrons.
In silicon the other four Si electrons are weakly bound and are called valence
electrons the four valence electrons occupy four of the eight allowed next higher energy
states above the core level.
The above discussion describes isolated atom; but practically they exist in a
crystalline state where atoms are closer together; the inner core is not affected; however,
when the atoms are closer together (crystalline state) gives rise to closely spaced sets of
energy states called energy bands. In interatomic distance the allowed states consist of
two bands separated by an energy gap. The upper band of allowed states is called
conduction band and lower band of allowed states is called the valence band. The gap
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between these bands is called band gap (forbidden gap). The valence band is
completely filled with electrons and the conduction band is devoid of electrons there is no
current flow. Albeit, the electrons can move in the valence band there is no current flow
because the net momentum of electrons in a band is zero. There are no carriers if the
bonding has no broken bonds. If the bonds are broken the electron ifs free to move and
excited to the conduction band. these electrons are carriers and current is attributed to
them. The energy required to break a bond in Si-Si bonding is band gap energy. In
addition to release of electron by breaking Si-Si bond creates an empty state from the
missing electron now in the conduction band. The empty state in valency band can move
about and is called a hole and also a current carrying carrier. There is no current flow if
there are no broken bonds. Band gap is an important concept for material classification
vis-a- vis electrical current carrying capabilities (insulators, semiconductors and metal).

Si atom (Figure 2.2 from Pierret,1996)
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Types of Materials (Figure 2.8 from Pierret,1996)

Thermal energy by exciting electrons from the valence band to the conduction
band creates current carrying capability. By adding selected impurities Si becomes an
excellent semiconductor. Temperature is a key parameter in functioning of a semiconductor as shown in Figure 2.8. As shown, the semiconductor becomes intrinsic at
elevated temperatures- no longer a functioning semiconductor as shown in Figure 2.22.
From the graph it can be see that semiconductor response at elevated temperatures is very
similar response as at very low temperatures- not sufficient energy for electron to move
into conduction band from valence band.
There are three types of electronic materials; semiconductors, insulators,
conductors (metals).
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In semiconductors, carrier numbers in an intrinsic material are equal and
relatively small; the carrier concentrations can be selectively increased by adding special
impurity atoms or dopants to the semiconductor.

Semiconductor Temperature Characteristics (Figure 2.22 from Pierret,1996)
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Definitions (from Pierret,1996)

Dopants for Silicon (Figure 2.22 from Pierret,1996)

The electron volt eV unit of energy 1.6x10^-19J. Doped silicon is the most widely
used semiconductor for all electronic products. It has 14 atoms according to the Bohr
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model. 10 are tightly bound and four are loosely bound. They are called valence
electrons. Valence electrons and holes from the dopant are current carriers. The energy
required to break the bond, and the bandage energy are the same thing.
A more detailed discussion of semiconductors is out of the scope. Only salient
features are discussed for the effect on semiconductors.
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APPENDIX Z.
STANDOFF DISTANCE PREDICTABILITY

Graph of Equation for Unobstructed Case
221

Graph of Equation for Obstructed Case
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